Compatibilists agree that "contra causal free will" is a myth.

Why then all these seemingly respectable scientists and philosophers proceed to engage in the mental gymnastics with redefinition of what the term "free will" means?

Most of the arguments for this new kind of free will is something like

>"We have this strong intuition that we make choices, so let's just slightly adjust the definition, save the concept; and btw let's not talk about this too much lest unwashed masses go ape"

why?

I get that it's difficult to imagine how we structure society without the concept of moral blame/responsibility. I'm not saying we should rip the band-aid off and throw away entire legal system. Reforms should happen slowly.

But I don't see how it serves any worthwhile purpose to play word games, and bury the lede entirely.

Introduction

Greetings!

I have noticed that whenever free-will comes up, most people here will either deny it completely (Hard Determinist) or accept it but deny determinism (Libertarianism). This usually falls along the atheist / theist divide, with atheists being Hard Determinists and theists being Libertarians. The "middle" position, Compatibilism, is unpopular. Many will even declare it absurd or incomprehensible,, which I think is a bit unfair. I think this comes from a lack of understanding of what exactly the position encompasses, and does and does not assert . My hope in this post is to at the very least convince people that compatibilism isn't absurd, even if I can't convince them to adopt it

Definitions

By determinism, we mean the claim that 1) the universe follows unchanging, deterministic laws, and 2) all future states of the universe are completely determined by the initial state together with these laws. Both Hard Deterministis and Compatiibilists accept determinism, which is backed by all our current scientific theories. What they differ in is their acceptance of free will

NB. As a quick qualification, determinism is actually a bit of a misnomer. It might be that our universe also has stochastic processes, if certain interpretations of quantum mechanics turn out to be correct. However, I think we can agree that random quantum fluctuations or wave function collapse do not grant us free will. They are stochastic noise. So in the remainder of this discussion I will ignore these small effects and treat the universe as fully deterministic

Now, there are actually two common definitions of free-will:

1. Free will is the ability to act according to one's wants, unencumbered, and absent external control. I will call this version free-act
2. Free will is the ability to, at a certain moment in time, have multiple alternative possible futures available from which we can choose. It is the "freedom to do otherwise". I'll call this free-choice

The former is obviously a weaker thesis than the latter. I will argue for them both in turn, with focus on the second.

Argument for Free-act

Free-act is not incompatible with determinist. It may well be that our wants are predetermined. But we still have the ability to carry out those wants. For example, if I am thirsty, I have the ability to get a glass of water. If I am tired, I can sleep. If I want to be kind or be mean, I can do that too. In some sense, we can only do what we w

I’m sure the question of free will vs. determinism gets asked extensively but my question is a bit different.

Are there any philosophers who thought that the answer to free well vs. determinism (vs. compatibilism) was neither?

If so, what were some proposed ideas against them?

I listened to a fascinating (and frustrating) debate on Clubhouse some months ago that included Sean and Sam Harris arguing over the existence of free will. In many ways, they seem to argue past each other, each side believing the other has not addressed any of their points. I felt like I understood both their arguments and I wanted to tackle the problem myself.

Both compatibilists and incompatibilists agree that at the level of fundamental physics, free will does not exist. Where they differ is that compatibilists like Sean believe free will can exist at the level of everyday life. Some of their evidence is that it is obviously useful to use language like “I did something willingly” or “I was forced to do that”. Anything that is a useful predictable pattern is real (according to Dennett’s conception of real), therefore we can say free will is real.

Incompatibilists argue that free will is not real, both because of obvious physical laws and also because the sort of free will that the compatibilist define is simply not satisfactory. They often bring up the fact that we unnecessarily blame and punish people for crimes that they could not have done otherwise.

I’m not sure if I’m the first one to have this idea, but I think a key insight that would resolve this dispute is simply that there exists multiple levels of description for everyday life.

Allow me to explain:

People familiar with Sean’s work will know his ideas about poetic naturalism and how we can describe things at different levels of description. Something could not exist at one level and appear in another level. For example, fluid mechanics doesn’t exist when we are talking about individual atoms, but it does exist when we talk about rivers.

It is also possible for things to exist at a deep level of description and then disappear at a higher level. An example would be multiple worlds. If the many worlds theory is true, then parallel worlds exist at the most fundamental of description, however they do not exist at the level of everyday life because we have no access to them and therefore it is useless to act as though they exist.

Time is also an interesting case where it appears to exist and then not exist, but then exist again. Most physicists think time exists at the fundamental level of the universe. However, at the level of everyday life, in many ways time no longer exists. We are creatures that live eternally in the present. Just like how we have no access to parallel worlds, we have no

Is it not true that (1) a compatibilist notion of free will is (while useful for some purposes, such as assessing culpability) quite different from how most nonphilosophers conceive of free will; (2) by free will most laypeople essentially mean libertarian free will; & (3) most philosophers do not take libertarianism seriously?

It’s unclear to me why philosophers here state that their consensus view is that there is (compatibilist) free will when asked by a layperson despite presumably knowing that a nonphilosopher is almost certainly referring to libertarian free will.

In other words, isn’t the philosophical consensus that libertarianism is nonsensical and the mind is as subject to determinism as the rest of the universe (to put it crudely, that there is nothing aside from nature and nurture)?

Apologies if asked before.

I have read this article: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/compatibilism/

There are several things in it that I don't understand. I would like help to understand it. Thanks in advance!

> The willing addict, like the unwilling addict, has conflicting first-order desires as regards taking the drug to which she is addicted. But the willing addict, by way of a second-order volition, embraces her addictive first-order desire to take the drug. She wants to be as she is and act as she does. > > It is now easy to illustrate Frankfurt’s hierarchical theory of free will. The unwilling addict does not take the drug of her own free will since her will conflicts at a higher level with what she wishes it to be. The willing addict, however, takes the drug of her own free will since her will meshes with what she wishes it to be. Frankurt’s theory can now be set out as follows: > > One acts of her own free will if and only if her action issues from the will she wants.

It seems to me that by the Frankfurt definition here, most people have free will only occasionally.

I wish I enjoyed exercising, but I actually hate exercising, so I don't. Apparently, when I occasionally do exercise, I have free will, but when I don't, I have no free will.

Similarly, I wish I enjoyed cooking, but I don't, so I let my wife do it. Evidently that's not of my free will either.

It seems really strange to judge that certain actions are free because they happen to coincide with certain desires while other actions are not free because they happen to conflict with certain desires.

> For Wolf, free will concerns an agent’s ability to act in accord with the True and the Good.

Does Susan Wolf's argument assume that moral realism is true and that everyone agrees what the True and the Good is?

> Put in terms of guidance and regulative control, only blameworthy conduct requires regulative control. Guidance control is sufficient for praiseworthy conduct. Wolf’s reasoning is that, if an agent does act in accord with the True and the Good, and if indeed she is so psychologically determined that she cannot but act in accord with the True and the Good, her inability to act otherwise does not threaten the sort of freedom that morally responsible agents need. For how could her freedom be in any way enhanced simply by adding an ability to act irrationally?

This makes no sense to me. I don't think I understand what "guidance control" is. As far as I understand, guidance cont

Buddha talked of annats. Does that mean there is no free will?

Finding the topic a little hard to digest, hoping this approach will click some pieces into place. Thank you in advance!

I've heard from multiple sources that some Compatibilists do include the ability to do otherwise into their theories, but have yet to actually find an example.

I just can’t wrap my hand around Compatibilism. I have read the definitions and articles and discussions, but I still don’t understand why this should make more sense than hard determinism.

Im not ignorant, im really open minded and want to understand but I just don’t.

If I build a simulation where everything is deterministic and I could restart the simulation and everything would always happed the exact same way I would say, the ppl inside the simulation have no free will, because in a cosmic sense, their actual choices (not just what they want) are the result of everything that has happened before. That makes sense for me.

Compatibilism now says (at least I understand it that way)because you could have done otherwise, you have free will.

Even if there is no external force, every atom of my brain would have been the same therefore I could not have done otherwise. Speaking as a simulation the code would be the same, therefore the result would be the same.

How does Compatibilism makes more sense than hard determinism? I really want to understand

Compatibilism asserts that free will remains a meaningful concept even within a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. There is no conflict between the notion that my choice was causally necessary from any prior point in time (determinism) and the notion that it was me that actually did the choosing (free will).

The only way that determinism and free will become contradictory is by bad definitions. For example, if we define determinism as “the absence of free will”, or, if we define free will as “the absence of determinism”, then obviously they would be incompatible. So, let’s not do that.

Determinism asserts that every event is the reliable result of prior events. It derives this from the presumption that we live in a world of perfectly reliable cause and effect. Our choices, for example, are reliably caused by our choosing. The choosing operation is a deterministic event that inputs two or more options, applies some criteria of comparative evaluation, and, based on that evaluation, outputs a single choice. The choice is usually in the form of an “I will X”, where X is what we have decided we will do. This chosen intent then motivates and directs our subsequent actions.

Free will is literally a freely chosen “I will”. The question is: What is it that our choice is expected to be “free of”? Operationally, free will is when we decide for ourselves what we will do while “free of coercion and undue influence“.

Coercion is when someone forces their will upon us by threatening harm. For example, the bank robber pointing a gun at the bank teller, saying “Fill this bag with money or I’ll shoot you.”

Undue influence includes things like a significant mental illness, one that distorts our view of reality with hallucinations or delusions, or that impairs the ability of the brain to reason, or that imposes upon us an irresistible impulse. Undue influence would also include things like hypnosis, or the influence of those exercising some control over us, such as between a parent and child, or a doctor and patient, or a commander and soldier. It can also include other forms of manipulation that are either too subtle or too strong to resist. These are all influences that can be reasonably said to remove our control of our choices.

The operational definition of free will is used when assessing someone’s moral or legal responsibility for their actions.

Note that free will is not “free from causal necessity” (reliable cause and effect)

So Compatibilism and Determinism do not exclude each other. I have a question however. Let’s say I want to play a video game with my friend and we play against each other. Is the outcome already predetermined? If so why would I have joy playing the game? Sorry if I completely misunderstood compatibilism

In the free will-debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists there are sometimes claims made about which of the two positions lines up the most with (lay?)people's views on free will.

On this sub, I've read about a study that investigated people's intuition on this subject. I can't find it right now, but it seemed like depending on how the questions were worded, the responses varied such that they sometimes were in agreement with compatibalist views, and sometimes were not.

But after lurking this sub and reading discussions about free will elsewhere, I've gotten the impression that not understanding how we can have free will while living in a deterministic (or slightly random) universe is really confusing for people who first encounter compatibilism. On the other hand, almost no one have a problem with understanding incompatiblism. Well except for those who mix up not having free will with fatalism at least.

I would appreciate some thoughts on this, and perhaps some resources to read more about it :)

Hey all

This is a question I have struggled with for awhile, and I am sure it is brought up fairly often so I would appreciate any insights.

I understand that compatibilism is a a major position in the philosophy of free will - basically that we are free to do as we will, but not free to will as we will.

However, I have always struggled to see how it can maintain a semblance of moral responsibility in contrast to hard determinism. But I know that this is the minority position so I must just be missing something.

Basically, my question is why is the murderer 'morally responsible' under compatibilism, whilst an avalanche is not.

My basic thought process is that is we grant that we are but matter subject to the laws of nature, then our will itself is governed by these very laws. In the same manner in which a boulder rolling a hill is subject to the law of gravity. However, if I were to inflict harm I would be held responsible, whereas the boulder would not. But why? The only difference I can see is my possession of some form of mental state that facilitated the process - but as this introduces no real agency - it seems to not be more morally relevant than any other difference between myself and the boulder - such as our density.

Am I perhaps fundamentally mistaken that compatibilism entails moral responsibility?

Thank you so much.

So I have read some articles on free and have asked a few questions in this sub but I am still not 100%sure what compatibilism is. Let’s say I have the Choice to go out with my friends on Friday and I evaluate the situation and decide to do so. So was the decision a decision of free will but it was still 100% determinable beforehand (and if you believe that does that fact change anything for you or make you sad?)?and what if a machine predicted this behavior but since I see the result of the machine I decide not to go out with my friends.. would that be possible?

I've noticed this for like the past 7ish years on Reddit. There are rarely any other beliefs that are paired with the statistics on what the philosophy community believes.

When somebody says they are a compatibilist, does that mean they think free will and determinism are both true, or merely that free will and determinism are compatible (without taking a position on their truth value)?

Is Libertarian Compatibilism possible? Any libertarians who believe in it or have written about it?

I recall thinking that Gilbert Ryle's The Concept of Mind was a compatibilist work. I originally thought that by category-mistake, he meant that we have free will as even if we were determined, that does not take away from the fact that we experience ourselves and thus act as we are. In other words, we are our nature, and thus even if our nature were determined, and we were never to falter from acting within our nature, this does not take away from the fact we are still acting freely as we are our nature. Of course, this isn't what he's talking about at all, rather he is referring to the mind-body dualism problem, but I'm wondering what the key arguments are in this debate.

I recall hearing the analogy that questions whether you are really trapped if someone locks you in a room for a certain amount of time, but you are not aware that you are locked in, and you only happen to want to leave after they unlock the door. I can't remember who came up with this idea, but this is still not quite the position I have.

This is my position:

1. We are human beings. We have an inner life, and appear to make decisions on some level.
2. It would seem we have been created by something. Something would seem to have created our nature (including our conscience and how it is we self-transcend ourselves in existentialism).
3. Assuming the universe is deterministic, and some creator made us to be a certain way, this does not affect the fact that we are that way. If we were made evil, we are evil. If we were made to choose to eat oreos for dinner on the 26th August 2021, we still chose to do so. It seems to me that the universe being deterministic transcends our subjectivity.

I can understand the argument that people have compulsions, and there seems to be a weakness to the strength of our will. But I cannot see how people could disagree that at some level, there seems to be some fundamental bent with which we decide to do things, and that this by definition is freedom. I can understand arguments for the constraints of said freedom, and I can certainly imagine some circumstances where this is so constrained we aren't free, but this general position seems so strong to me I want to understand it better. I'm sure this is a position taken by many philosophers, so would anyone be able to let me know what this stance is called, and what some of the arguments against it/ refinements of it are? Cheers.

I suppose I can summarize the argument if it needs to be done, but I won't do it unless requested. Thanks for any replies!

For me personally I've yet to see any convincing arguments for the three listed at best we just have an illusion of them especially free will I want to know your thoughts personally.

I'm trying to understand the explanation in this comment, specifically:

"that's not what I mean when I say, 'I could have made that putt,' what I mean is: I'm competent with those kinds of putts. If you give me 50 putts from 6 feet out on this kind of green, I'll make 46 of them. I'm a competent putter."

From what I can tell, this implies that the 'determinist' view suggests that the person _should_ have made that putt, but because of his 'free will', he missed it (correct me if I'm wrong, because I have a feeling that this is exactly where I'm missing the point). However, it seems to me that the 4/50 putts that miss only do so because it is an unpredictable or unlikely event or 'decision' to miss the shot.

Is this the justification for compatibilism or indeterminism? Do compatibilists believe that 'true agency' is explained by some unlikely instances of people making unpredictable decisions/actions given their environments?

(Also pinging /u/Angry_Grammarian since it's your comment)

Imagine a society where they, like us, value gold.

They find it incredibly beautiful, and thus valuable.

Independent of this, this society also believes that the beauty of gold is a "gift from God".

Now these people one day cease to be religious. No one believes in God any longer.

But, they find that gold is still valuable, because gold is still beautiful.

They realize that this property is retained, because the relationship between the gold and its value never really depended on their religiousity in the first place.

This is how many compatibilists view moral responsibility. The value of moral responsibility that is retained independent of the kind of free will a hard determinist (and a compatibilist) rejects, is the only one we should care about. When I as a compatibilist say I believe in free will, it is only in a conventional sense. The truth is I could care less about free will and the free will debate, that's not what I really care about. What I really care about is that people believe in responsibility, and take responsibility. Not because responsibility is a Gift from god, but because it is good for us. And if it wasn't, then I wouldn't. What this means is my response to the question of free will is contextual. If I speak to a Christian, then I dont believe in free will. If I speak to a hard determinist who thinks we're "ultimately" just like hurricanes because our behavior is "ultimately" caused by external factors, then I believe in free will.

I know some people here reject the concept of moral responsibility altogether. I have this question for you: you still find the concept of forgiveness useful? What about forgiveness makes it categorically different from moral blame such that hard determinism immediately cuts one away but not the other? To me, what saves one also saves the other. I believe in forgiveness, not because you could have done differently in some cosmic sense, but because you should have. That is a pre-requisite for giving you, otherwise what does it even mean to forgive someone? I don't forgive the hurricane. Same goes for moral blame. And if I say "you could have done differently", it is also in a social constructionist sense. It is not a statement of ontology.

I also know some people here point to the harmful effects a belief in free will and moral responsibility can have, but there are also harmful effects a belief in hard determinism can have.

Free will?, maybe.. maybe not Free ability, yes.. or no? (if your ability is oppressed, by someone and their free ability to enforce their beliefs on you) …then isn’t that disabling someone’s ability to express it freely? (oppressing)

and what does free mean? just that you are under control of someone else (oppressed [opposite] free)?

wouldn’t “Potential ability” be more correct instead of free will…

because you have a potential to display change and to display change you must be able (ability)

If one rejects the principle of alternate possibilities and is persuaded by Frankfuty style arguments that even if determinism is true, you are morally responsible because the will came from you. No external source forced you to choose although you couldn't have chosen otherwise. I guess that's source compatibilism. I am having trouble as to how would you accommodate regret for an action that you couldn't have done otherwise? It's weird to say "I shouldn't have done (regret) an act" when you know that you couldn't have done otherwise. I have the intuition that you are morally responsible for an action that was determined but you would have chosen that anyways if it wasn't determined, but I am not having the same intuition with regards to regret or guilt.

I've been doing some light reading/research (and I really mean LIGHT) about evolution and faith. And my question is in what ways can evolution and faith exist in tandem? Can they exist together? And are they/can be reliant on each other?

What I have been reading is always from a Judeo-Christian vs evolution perspective. So, the arguments for and against coexistence are usually centered around Christianity, at least from what I have seen, which is seems problematic in itself. When the question is not necessarily revolved around a Christian ideology, but more along the lines of faith in general. Faith being belief in something divine, spiritual, or just religion in general.

The one thing I find concerning about this question is that there seems to be a growing number of people and experts that outright deny the existence of something spiritual/divine. Even some suggesting belief in a god or like thing is dangerous. And of course there are those of faith that believe evolution to be dangerous. Many already believe that faith and evolution are compatible though I have not read any detailed explanations as why they are compatible and in what ways these ideas are compatible. Maybe if I could be pointed into the direction of some works involving the relation of evolution and faith compatibilism?

Faith obviously has is issues, but evolution does too. Evolution does not explain the origin of life among other things. Faith has some outlandish explanations of the origin of life, but the core premise it seems is that something created life as we know it. This does not mean the humans were created outright as well as other life and the evidence of evolution suggests this. After what I have read I am leaning to the idea that faith and evolution are closely intertwined and even reliant on each other for a full explanation of life. But the divide between the two seems quite established, so I am wondering if I am missing something.

EDIT: Just wanted to add this question:

Wouldn't it be possible to have a creator/force/whatever put evolution into effect?

Seeing as Stoicism is generally considered Compatibilistic, and considering I've practiced Stoicism for a few years now I figure this can belong here rather than a philosophy-forum (although I've put it up there as well without feeling satisfied).

So as far as I've come to understand it, Compatibilism fancies itself as a combination or middleground between Free Will and Determinism, saying: "yes everything is predetermined, but we also have free will" and explains this by saying we have free will because we can do what we Will (tell me if I've misunderstood that, that's the explanation I've seen elsewhere).

Now to me this just seems like the compatibilist has made a new definition of what Free Will means from the one used in the original discussion, which doesn't put Compatibilists in the middle but rather makes them Determinists who want to adress if we can still hold people morally responsible for their actions.

In the original discussion Free Will is saying the future and our actions are not predetermined through earlier actions, instead we still have the power to change the future. While determinism says that no the future is set, as our own thoughts and actions are set through earlier events just as the rest of the world.

The fact that we can do what we will (so long as we're not hindered) is just a fact, it's not what the discussion is about. The discussion is whether what we Will is predetermined or not.

I hope I made myself understood, and if someone feels I've misunderstood anything, please let me know.

Tl;dr: Compatibilism doesn't seem to be a middleground between Free Will and Determinism as it to my knowledge claims to be. Furthermore it's not even adressing Free Will but something else.

In Destiny's debate with Brenton the other day he claimed that a compatibilist account of free will is required for any ethical language. Why does he think this?

The delusion creating the determinism "versus" free will paradox is the notion that reliable causation is an external force that exercises control over our choices and our actions. But the notion of causation is merely descriptive, it is not itself a cause. Only the actual objects and forces that make up the physical universe can be said to cause events. The notion of causation is used to describe the behavior of these objects and forces as they interact with each other to bring about events.

For example, it is the mass of the Sun and the Earth, combined with the initial trajectory of the Earth, that causes the Earth to orbit the Sun. Causation does not cause this event. The two objects and the forces of gravity and momentum are the actual causes of the annual orbit.

Why is it important to keep this straight? Because we happen to be one of those objects that goes about in the world causing events. If we cause good things, then other people will encourage us by praise or reward, in order to motivate us to keep up the good work. If we cause unnecessary harm, then other people will blame or punish us to discourage us from this behavior.

There is no contradiction between the fact that an event is reliably caused (determinism) and that it is reliably caused by us (free will). The two notions are perfectly compatible. Free will does not mean freedom from causation. Free will simply means that our choice was free of coercion and other forms of undue influence.

Notions of causation, determinism, and the metaphorical "laws of nature" are all descriptive of the behavior of the actual objects and forces and of the reliability of that behavior. But these descriptions are merely comments about what we and all the other objects and forces are doing. These concepts never cause anything themselves. The belief that they are external entities that control our choices and our actions is a delusion.

Causation never causes anything. Determinism never determines anything. But we can cause things, and we can decide what we will do.

At first it seemed like a rather intuitive concept but then I thought I can’t even really decide to think positively about it and still enjoy life etc , since my decision is already predetermined. Am I wrong ?

For me personally I've yet to see any convincing arguments for the three listed at best we just have an illusion of them especially free will but I wanna hear your thoughts?