Plotinus Puns

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Here are my Notes on Plotinus - Ennead Three, Third Tractate - On Providence - Part Two

In this tractate, Plotinus finishes up where he left off in Part One. This part primarily deals with reconciling how people can choose to do Evil acts, the fact that everything is within the bounds of Providence, and yet how Providence is not responsible for Evil.

It is revealed that Reasons are parts of Universal Soul, and thus are Particular Souls. Particular Souls are free agents, and may choose to do Evil acts. This fact is encompassed within Providence, but not caused by it. As a consequence, the Good things people do are also not caused by Providence. Rather, they are caused by the person who acts. Yet Good acts are in harmony with Providence, while Evil acts are discordant with it.

Providence is defined as an emanation from superior things to inferior things. For example, following a Doctors orders to restore health can be interpreted as the Providence of the doctor. Thus, there is a cascading chain of Providence in accordance with the procession of Emanation going all the way back to the most primordial principle (i.e. The Good).

Finally, we are given the analogy of the branches. Everything is said to derive from a single Principle, like the roots of the tree. Though eventually the roots diverge into branches, and then leaves and fruit, they all derive from the same source. This analogy mirrors the manifestation of Providence from The Good down into the sensible world.

Some of the more interesting excerpts to me are:

The universal Reason encompasses both Good and Evil events. Both Good and Evil events make up its parts. Now, universal Reason does not create Good and Evil, but rather they are encompassed by it transitively. The Reasons are Expressions of Intellectual Principles, and they are the act of a universal Soul. Thus, these Reasons are parts of the universal Soul, particular Souls.

Circumstances derive from the events which occurred before them, and get woven into what will become future events. This chain of events is in accordance with a universal Providence, as they all derive from, are contained within, and contribute their individual Nature to a primordial Principle. Just as the particulars of an army are governed by a genera

I think I read somewhere that this is the case, but can't remember where I read it. Is there any truth to this?

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Here are my Notes on Plotinus - Ennead Three, Second Tractate - On Providence - Part One

In this tractate, the first of a two part discourse, Plotinus gives us an introduction into his conception of Providence. We learn how Reason is the process that generates particulars from universals out of necessity.

Plotinus gives us a conception of a necessary generation of the sensible world in accordance with the blueprint that is Nous, the Divine Intellect.

In writing this conception, Plotinus must defend the punishments we receive as a consequence of our actions, since our actions derive from Reason. Plotinus must also account for how Evil can exist if everything is a copy of things within Divine Intellect.

Plotinus’ position is that Evil is a result of the fact that differentiation necessarily entails incompleteness. For things to be different from one another, they must be incomplete (allowing for there to be an ‘other’). Because the sensible world of particular things is different from the Universals of Divinity, things of this realm are worse, in conflict, and subject to destruction and flux.

Plotinus ends the tractate with some probing questions for part two. Are all manifestations of universals Souls, or are some merely seminal causes for things? I guess we will find out next time.

Some of the more interesting exerpts to me are:

Universal Providence is due to the fact that everything within the Universe is arranged in accordance with Nous, the Divine Intellect. We hold that Nous is prior to the sensible universe, not in terms of time, but because the universe is contingent upon it. Since this Divine Intellect is a prerequisite for the sensible world, it must come first. In a way, Intellect can be thought of as the blueprint or model for this universe. The Eternal nature of Intellect results in the Eternal nature of the universe, as the universe proceeds from it in its image.

Divinity has produced a sensible world which is Beautiful, complete, self-sufficient, and harmonious. Each piece plays its part, contributing to the greater whole for the benefit of the small and insignificant parts as much as for the big and significant parts. We cannot judge the whole based on each part individually. We must judge each part as it contributes to the transcendent harmony.

When something excites us at first experience, we are easily carried away by

A question related to the 'WISE HEATHENS' (Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinus, etc.), which, despite not having any relationship with Christianity, were taken as influences by the First Fathers themselves (Origen, Clement, Gregory, Basil, among others), to the point to even rely on their systems and interpretations, for example, in the case of Philon of Alexandria, who had a deeply Platonic and Pythagorean bias, and his OT interpretations are used by Origen, or else in the case of Gregory and Clement, bringing much of Neoplatonism, praising Plato and using metaphysical concepts from this tradition and incorporating them into Christianity, etc. Reflecting on this, can we infer an action of the Word that goes beyond the historical religious institution and inspires or even communicates to the Sages in all times and peoples? Would it be implicit, therefore, a possibility of intellectual contact with the Truth, regardless of intermediaries?

I'm interested in learning about Plotinus' philosophy, what would be a good place to start? I heard that Plato's Parmenides was very important to Plotinus, I have not read it yet. Would you recommend reading Parmenides before reading about Plotinus in particular?

Thomas Aquinas teaches that experience is necessarily and naturally dependent on embodiment (ST I, q, 84, a, 7, c, https://www.ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/FP/FP084.html#FPQ84A7THEP1)

I was wondering if Plotinus believes the same. For Thomists, as far as I know, God alone can give the disembodied mind experience without the need for phantasms (which are obviously dependent on physical states), but this would be a miracle.

If I should clarify more let me know.

Hello again everyone. Here is are my compiled Notes on Plotinus – Ennead Two.

Once again, I have compiled them into a single PDF to celebrate.

Ennead Two is all about the physical world and how it is administered by Soul. We have tractates investigating the Nature of Matter, the movement of the sun and stars, casualty, and sometimes peculiar commentaries on surprisingly specific subjects. Some length is given to investigating why objects which are far away appear to be smaller. You also see Plotinus refuting the beliefs of his contemporaries. Astrology and Gnosticism are broken down and refuted one proposition at a time.

Central to Plotinus Physical system is the manifestation of physical phenomena based on metaphysical principles. Everything in the sensible world is a physical manifestation of something Ideal. Soul plays the part in turning these Ideal blueprints into physical actualities. There are several consequences to this system. For one, it implies a sort of providence and determinism because Soul is said to busy itself manifesting every single possible Ideal thing into the physical world. Everything that happens in the physical world is governed by this process, and was destined to happen based on the necessary order and structure of the metaphysical Ideal Realm (i.e. Nous). For another, it pronounces this providential determinism as Divine, and urges us to accept the circumstances we experience in the sensible world as necessary and ultimately suitable to the wellbeing of the transcendent unity. We are discouraged from scorning fate, and are taught to see our embodied experiences as a necessary part of the grand order of all things which will ultimately reunite us with The One.

Some of the more interesting positions and arguments are as follows:

Plotinus classifies all Matter as being comprised of Earth, Water, Air, and Fire. At first glance this sounds like some silliness from a fantasy book or video game, but as you read on it becomes apparent that these represent a primordial conception of the phases of Matter. Earth then is like Solids, Water is like Liquids, Air is like Gasses, and Fire is like Plasma.

The entire Material Cosmos is said to be an eternal closed system. It remains 'itself' in perpetuity, but with its internal components in constant flux. There are echoes to Parmenides Poem (as opposed to the dialog by the same name), where it is argued that since the entire Uni

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Here are my Notes on Plotinus - Ennead Two, Ninth Tractate - The World and That Which Generates It Are Not Evil (Against The Gnostics)

In this tractate, Plotinus appears to deliver a scathing polemic against a sect of Gnostics. It is unclear whether he is referring to a specific group of people or the movement more generally. In some cases it is likely that he didn’t fully understand the arguments and positions put forth by the Gnostics. What is clear is that he had big issues with them! He took great offense to many of their beliefs (especially where he perceives that they insult Plato and the ancient Greek philosophers) and they were competing with him for the spiritual and philosophical minds of Alexandria at the time.

This tractate is usually translated as Against The Gnostics, but Plotinus does not use this term even once. This title and any references to the term Gnostic have been added in by translators. In some ways this is good and accurate, but I decided to refrain from using the term outside of a few parenthetical references. Given the insults that Plotinus levies against his opponents, I doubt he was just being polite. My speculation is that he didn’t want to give them free advertising, so in a way I am trying to respect that.

The actual content of the tractate is immense. It is one of the longer tractates, and it is dense. Plotinus admits that he is addressing a mixed audience of his students and former or transitioning members of the opposing school. He spends a lot of time both refuting claims and arguments made by this opposing school, as well as presenting his alternative system. The result is some of the most concise outlines of his system you can find, which is perhaps why this particular tractate is one of the most popular.

Some of the bigger picture items are:

There can only be three Hypostasis: The One, Nous, and Soul. There can be no fewer, and proposing any more results in adding in arbitrary and meaningless distinctions which are unwarranted.

Since the One is uncaused and necessitates everything after it, everything is immune to total destruction (although things which are subject to flux can change form).

Soul is not Evil, and the sensible world it generates is not Evil. In fact, this is proof of its Divinity and power. Soul is argued to translate the Divine to the sensible world and it does so using its characteristic powers of generat

So, in my burgeoning interest in Hellenic polytheism, I've often read modern practitioners who mention some combination of ideas from Proclus, Iamblichus, Plotinus, and Sallust.

I feel like it is time for me to actually read some of the works of the philosophers that have influenced my religious practice, and to stop relying on others to do the reading for me so to speak.

However, I have no real background in philosophy, and I am a bit concerned that I will get lost in what I imagine are pretty dense texts.

Does anyone have a recommendation for good places to start reading these philosophers? Are there particular works of theirs which you feel are particularly helpful for understanding some of the later Hellenic philosophy?

Christians within Medieval Europe took to Plato and attempted to rectify Plato with Christianity. The Medieval era was obsessed with the Greeks. But, what about Plotinus? Did any scholar focus on Plotinus? Was he not readily available? Was he too pagan?

Thanks!

So, a god has to be conscious or aware at least some of the time. Something that is never conscious or aware cannot be called a god.

Socrates and Plato talked about the Form of the Good as being even more exalted than the Form of the Beautiful and the Form of the True. Apparently John Uebersax has written that the Form of the Good is equivalent to God. But I think Uebersax is highly prestigious, so maybe he understands a lot of things I am not aware of.

Uebersax wrote: >For Plato, God is the ‘Form of the Good’. A Form here means an Ideal — an eternal fundamental principle, of which material objects and attributes are imperfect copies. So God is the Ideal of perfect Goodness and source of all that is Good.

https://www.quora.com/What-was-Platos-view-on-God

However, I don't think Socrates ever said that the Forms are conscious or aware. In fact, that is why Socrates was not proposing to replace the Olympian gods. So I think Socrates would disagree with Uebersax.

To complicate the issue, I think Plotinus made the innovation of saying the the ONE was the Form of the Good.

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Here are my Notes on Plotinus - Ennead Three, First Tractate - On Fate

In this tractate, Plotinus discusses that nature of Causality and addresses the problem of determinism and free will.

Plotinus rejects Atomist (and Materialist) explanations for Causality, and denies that Causal determinism is true on account of our apparent free will. To explain how some things appear to be causally linked while preserving our free will as agents, Plotinus concludes that some actions are determined by Fate, while others are Caused by our own free will. Since everything in the physical realm is bound up in physical chains of action and reaction, Plotinus deduces that free choices must be limited to Soul which is unhindered by a physical body. The less hindered by our body our Soul becomes, the more in control of our will we become. The unhindered Soul chooses to seek the Good, so the best things we do come from our Soul. The vile things people do are a product of Fate, where Soul becomes passive to the causal determinism of its associated body.

Some of the interesting arguments from the tractate include:

We cannot derive everything from Atoms. Since we are deriving everything from these Atoms, when they are present alone as Firsts, order has not been generated yet. After all, order is supposed to be derived from these Atoms. Without order, the Atoms can only move in disordered ways.

The idea that everything is governed by a single Soul is incompatible with a Causally determined Fate. To illustrate why, consider the movement of our limbs. It is impossible for the movement of our limbs to both be Caused by our own will and also determined by Fate. If the movement of our limbs is Caused by our own will, then we cannot say that the movement is also Caused by Fate. To argue for both necessitates the illogical position that a single event has two separate and distinct Causes. In this example, our mind is the prime mover of our limbs and can be the only Cause. To extend this line of reasoning, if everything is governed by a single Soul, then chains of Cause and effect cannot occur. How could a reaction to some event be both administered by a single Soul and also a necessary consequence of the event which directly preceded the reaction? Either the Soul is governing every action, or some actions are a result of Causality and not directly governed by Soul.

When Soul is by itse

I feel this is wrong but it has been the impression I have from reading on it thinking on all the Forms and "about" the One.

“The Wise men of Egypt, I think, also understood this, either by scientific or innate knowledge, and when they wished to signify something wisely, did not use the form of letters which follow the order of words and propositions and imitate sounds and the enunciations of philosophical statements, but by drawing images and inscribing in their temples one particular image of each particular thing, they manifested the non-discursiveness of the intelligible world, that is, that every image is a kind of knowledge and wisdom and is a subject of statements, all together in one, and not discourse or deliberation.“ - Plotinus, Enneads 5.8.6, trns. Armstrong

I first want to contrast Mainländer's (M) Simple Unity with Plotinus' (P) One.

M: The Simple (Basic, Primal) Unity is a Pure Contingency. That is, it might no longer be (meant in a non-temporal sense), or it might be different.

P: The One is meant to be a Pure Necessity. That is, it can never fail to be nor can it be otherwise.

Explanation:

M: The Freedom of the Simple Unity somehow precedes its Being. The Simple Unity is a Beyond-Being, an Over-Being or a Super-Being (Übersein), "standing" "above" Being.

P: The One is a Self-Willing. It is at the same instant a reason (ground) and a consequence (consequent) of Itself.

The reference to the birth of the world:

M: Out of the Pure Contingency arises or springs a Will. In Mainländer's case, it is the Will not to be (any)more, which Will at the same instant represents the birth of the world as the fragmentation of the Simple Unity. Obviously, a transformation is taking place here. The Simple Unity obtains a fragmented or initially fragmenting Being. With the fragmented Being I mean a direct transition into interconnected multiplicity and with the initially fragmenting Being I mean a transition of the point-like Simple Unity to a line-like self-extension, which then only disintegrates within itself.

P: From the One no (new) Will arises, since an eternal Will is already given. It is the Will to Itself. But from the One or the Self-Will arises, or rather emanates, the world.

The Plotinian concept of emanation is also used in reference to Mainländer's philosophy:

>The doctrine that Mainländer calls atheism is a theory of the emanation of the universe from a "pre-mundane unity" that no longer exists. (T. Whittaker)

To sum up:

We can say that with Mainländer a will to non-being arises from an omnipotent freedom or power and that with Plotinus a world arises from an already given will. So we are dealing with two very different models of the First Principle. Both models are elusive because they basically want to model that which is beyond our categories of understanding. Both Mainländer and Plotinus resort to linguistic means: M. does this with a language that operates only in an as-if mode, that is, that has merely a regulative status. P. does this by wanting the Will of the One to be understood only metaphorically. The as-if mode and the metaphor help us as an intuition pump, but we don't get beyond a stance or pose or mindset with them. For we are not supposed to take the speculations o

I heavily use a HUD menu search on my file manager and Inkscape, which are both GTK3. A HUD menu search allows me to search the menus of most GTK3 applications. For my file manager it warps me to folder bookmarks just by searching for them. For Inkscape I can search for a menu option instead of manually navigating through menus. This is a major part of my workflow and I fret if Caja and Inkscape get ported to GTK4 my workflow will be damaged.

Is there any plans for a distro agnostic GTK4 hud search such as these tools?

https://github.com/hardpixel/gnome-hud

https://github.com/ubuntu-mate/mate-hud

https://github.com/p-e-w/plotinus

I know GNOME does not control the direction of Inkscape and other parties GTK apps, but I am just pointing out if these developers decide to port their apps to GTK4 it will hurt my workflow.

In the tractate on Actuality and Potentiality (and I think in the one on Matter), Plotinus emphasizes that matter cannot have actuality, not like those of sensible objects or the Intellective Forms, because the point of matter is that it is potentially everything (sensible). As such it cannot be denoted as 'being' in anyway, because it isn't and never will be anything determinate. Plotinus even says at one point that its "being" is only homonymous with being proper.

There are two main things I have trouble understanding regarding this (though perhaps they're the same):

1. If it's a "non-being," nay, "Authentic Non-Existence" (as Plotinus calls it). Then shouldn't it simply not exist nor be a condition for anything? I mean, if you take the claim at face value, wouldn't it simply be saying that there is no principle that can "have form attached to it." This is all the more weird when Plotinus calls matter indestructible/unchanging at the end of the tractate (on Actuality and Potentiality), which seems like it's calling it some sort of substance.

2. If matter is always in a state of "potentially x," what does it even mean for it to accept some form? Does not that necessitate that the matter itself becomes something? For example, matter is potentially bread. So, when I bake bread, it is matter that has acquired all the forms that correspond to bread and now is the reason we say "this bread exists." So, sensible bread is now actual and we say it is because matter was potentially said bread, but at the same time the matter isn't actually anything. This makes the two (sensible object and matter) seem somewhat disconnected and also makes me question how matter can account for anything if it's never actually effected by the forms.

Plotinus also says that:

> its existence is no more than an announcement of a future, as it were a thrust forward to what is to come into existence

So, what is this to be saying? That matter is that which points to the future possibilities of sensible objects without ever being them? Would this mean that actual objects in the now exist through the Soul itself? Or in what way are actual sensible objects existent?

He also says:

> all that is allowed to it is to be a Potentiality, a weak and blurred phantasm, a thing incapable of a Shape of its own.

> Its actuality is that of being a phantasm, the actuality of being a falsity;

Is this framing matter as illusory? As in, the actuality of a phantasm is someone bel

Hey, I'm reading an introduction to neoplatonism and I need help with these doctrines. The book does not explain them nor can I find any description on Google of what they mean. The author keeps using them though ha. Here's the quote:

"Central here are Plotinus’ doctrines of internal and external activities (energeia) as well as “procession” (prohodos) and “reversion” or “conversion” (epistrophē" (from "Neoplatonism (Ancient Philosophies)" by Pauliina Remes)

My intuition for activities says some sort of essence or intrinsic energy? Idk ha! Any help appreciated

Wonderful quote from "Psyche and Cosmos" by Richard Tarnas (a wonderful book!).

Hello everyone! Here are my Notes on Plotinus - Ennead One.

I have always wanted to read Plotinus but found all of the available translations to be extremely confusing and hard to follow. After considerable research, I was unable to find anything satisfactory. So, mostly as an exercise for my own understanding, I have decided to go through the Enneads and spell things out as best I can. In the event that other people are having similar struggles, I have decided to post my notes in case they end up being helpful to anyone else. To celebrate my goal of finishing my notes on Ennead One by the end of last year, I compiled all of the tractates into a single booklet and reworked the editing (linked above). As I finish working on the rest of the Enneads, I will be posting them to my archive.org library in case anyone wants to follow along.

Please let me know what you think! Any questions, comments, and criticisms (either of the arguments themselves, or of my interpretations of them) are more then welcome. I hope perhaps someone finds this helpful and/or interesting.

The full notes can be found in the link above, but here is my take on the overarching concepts:

To me, Ennead One really is about laying the foundations of Plotinus' Cosmology and Ethics. The cosmos is one unified thing (i.e. Monism), that gets broken down into further and further complexity as new concepts and ideas are carved out of the transcendent whole.

Plotinus’ cosmology is based on a sort of ontological hierarchy. Things are defined as Real or Non Real based upon whether or not they are contingent upon other things for their existence. Consider a light source, an obstructing object, and a resulting shadow. The shadow will cease to exist if either the light source or the obstructing object is removed. The obstructing object and the light source, however, do not rely on the shadow at all for Existence. The obstructing object and light source can then be thought of as more Real than the shadow. The less things something relies upon, and the fewer the number of things that this 'something' relies on in turn rely on, the more Real the thing is. Consequently, the most Real thing must rely on nothing else but itself. The top of this ontological hierarchy is of course The One.

The One represents this transcendent unified whole. As soon as we speak or think of anything which is particular with

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Here are my Notes on Plotinus – Ennead Two, Seventh Tractate – On the Mixing of Bodies

In this tractate, Plotinus outlines a debate between the Peripatetics (descended from Aristotelian thought) and the Stoics on the nature of Bodies and how they mix together.

The Peripatetic school holds the position that coalescence only happens in terms of Quality. To them, the individual material components of the mixture remain distinct and separate, but the mixture itself takes on a unique Quality which gets distributed homogeneously throughout the Matter of the mixture.

The Stoics, on the other hand, assert that the matter of bodies make up a coalesced mixture, and completely penetrate into each other reciprocally.

Plotinus analyzises these positions and finds them unsatisfactory.

To answer this question, Plotinus must explain what makes a body. To Plotinus, bodies are an expression of the Form of Corporeality in Matter. So, when bodies mix, the incorporeal Matter and incorporeal Qualities of the bodies mix together.

Do you agree with any of these positions? Do you have a different interpretation of any of this? Please let me know in the comments!

If you enjoyed reading this, the rest of my notes (and now all of Ennead One) can be found here: https://archive.org/details/@nouskosmos

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Here are my Notes on Plotinus - Ennead Two, Fourth Tractate - On Matter.

In this tractate, Plotinus takes a deep dive into the origin and nature of Matter and Material objects.

Several theories of Matter are discussed, and it is concluded that Matter exists as the medium for things which receive Form, things which are differentiated, and things which are composite.

Two type of Matter are put fourth: One type is the Matter for corporeal/sensible objects. Matter of this variety which receives Form makes a Body. This type of Matter is in constant flux, as it takes on form after form in unending chains of transformation.

The second type of Matter is incorporeal Matter which makes up the Ideal realm. This Matter is different from corporeal Matter in a variety of ways. It primarily serves as the medium for the Ideal forms to express their characteristics which differentiate them. Because the Ideal realm is eternal, this matter is fixed and does not experience flux.

The primary nature of Matter is investigated, and it is concluded that Matter is necessarily Indefinite, in that it lacks any sort of Qualities (i.e. expressed/manifest Form) in of itself. It is this Indefinite nature of Matter which precisely makes it suitable as the medium for Form and differentiation. Because it lacks these characteristics in of itself, it is able to express them without altering its fundamental nature. This Indefinite nature makes Matter tricky to grasp via both the senses and intellect, because it lacks any Essential properties to experience or grasp via Reason. We can only know of it in a sort of apophatic way, by actively experiencing its absence. Plato calls this a ‘spurious act of reasoning’.

It is also this Indefinite nature which makes Matter, in a sense, Evil. This is because The Good is perfectly Definite, and Matter is its antithesis in being Indefinite.

As a bonus, here is an expert detailing a refutation of Atomism:

The concept of an Atom, an irreducible Body, is absurd for several reasons. All Bodies can be divided, which prevents any foundation based on a Body which is irreducibly simple. Atoms cannot account for the continuity of a particular object, as each individual Atom is self-contained and lacks any meaningful way to designate it as a part of one Body versus another. The fact that objects can be stretched, reshaped, and liquified proves that they are con

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Here are my Notes on Plotinus - Ennead Two, Fifth Tractate - On Potential and Actual.

In this relatively short tractate, Plotinus outlines the difference between Potential and Actual existence.

Something is said to exist Potentially as something else when it has the possibility to Be it in the future. Plotinus differentiates between Potential and Potentialities. Potential is a state of Being possessed by a subject when it can change. Potentialities are the particular possibilities. So Potential is something which metal ore possesses, and the form of a statue is one of the particular Potentialities which the ore can Become.

This dichotomy is mirrored with Actual existence and Actualities. Existing Actually is something that a subject is does. An Actuality is the combination of a subject and a particular state of Being.

In a way, Potential is like a medium for the possession of possibilities. Actualities are composites of a subject and it existing a certain way.

Plotinus spends some time arguing that the Ideal realm has no Potential, because it is Eternal and Perfect. Nothing ever changes there, and how can Potential exist where change is impossible?

Finally, Plotinus ties the discussion back into the bigger picture. Matter is defined as Pure Potential since it has the ability to become all Definite Beings. Because it is Pure Potential, it is like non-Being in that it lacks any of the Definition which Beings possess. As soon as Definite Being manifests in Matter, Matter loses its purity and is no longer Matter by itself.

Do you agree with any of these positions? Do you have a different interpretation of any of this? Please let me know in the comments!

If you enjoyed reading this, the rest of my notes (and now all of Ennead One) can be found here: https://archive.org/details/@nouskosmos

Hello again,

Here are my Notes on Plotinus - Ennead Two, Sixth Tractate - On Being, Essence, and Quality.

This one is a short three sections, but it was extremely challenging. This is mostly because each of the translations I read used different terms for what I refer to as Being, Essence, and Quality. The tractate is highly pedantic, and so keeping the terms strait was really important.

The conversation is about the relationship between Being, Essence and Quality.

To my mind:

Being is roughly the same thing as Existing. To Be is to Exist.

Essence is what is required for a particular Being to Exist.

Quality is a characteristic of a Being.

Plotinus’ overall point is that an Essential characteristic cannot be a Quality. This is because in order for something to have Qualities, it must Exist already. Qualities (at least in this tractate) are thus only ever Accidental to something which already exists. TO put it another way, you can remove a Quality from a Being without destroying it. You cannot remove an Essential characteristic from something without destroying it.

Essential Characteristics are then described not as Qualities, but Actualizations of Potential. In Ideal Beings, all of their characteristics are Actualizations of the limitless Potential of The One. In the corporeal realm, Essential Characteristics are Actualizations of a Corporeal object’s Potential to Participate in an Ideal Form (i.e. an Ideal Being).

Because Ideal Beings only possess Essential characteristics, they cannot rightly be said to possess Accidental Qualities. Sensible objects in the corporeal realm can have both Essential Actualizations, but also Accidental Qualities. This distinction illuminates that Corporeal Beings are further removed from Real Being as compared to Ideal Beings. Qualities are removed even further from Real Being since they are removed from Corporeal Objects (which themselves are already removed from Ideal Beings).

Perhaps the most interesting mystical conclusion here is that even Ideal Beings are removed from penultimate Real Being. Only The One is contingent upon nothing else, and so its Existence is the purest.

Do you agree with any of these positions? Do you have a different interpretation of any of this? Please let me know in the comments!

If you enjoyed reading this, the rest of my notes (and now all of Ennead One) can be found here: [https:/