Analytic–synthetic distinction Puns

I've read Quine and Putnam on the topic, but wondered if the discussion was still going on.

Reading Two Dogmas, and I get what is at stake for empiricists wrt Reductionism, but less so for the analytic-synthetic (as defined by Quine) divide. Would much appreciate any help

My general impression has been that Quine's critique of the distinction is regarded as a highly esteemed feat in the analytic tradition. I'm surprised to see that, from the PhilPapers survey, the majority of philosophers still accept the distinction. Why do they reject Quine's critique? Presumably because they have good reasons to do so, and if so, what criticisms have been made of Quine's relevant arguments?

From the phil papers survey, 64.9% of philosophers support the distinction. After reading the two dogmas of empiricism, I can't see how one would defend it. What is the central criticism of Quine's view that led a majority of philosophers to re-embrace the synthetic-analytic distinction? How is analytic understood in light of Quine's analysis of it? Is it as Quine defines it - "a statement is analytic when it is true by virtue of the meanings independently of fact"? Or has it been reinterpreted into a weaker sort of distinction in light of Quine's criticisms?

I guess I am mainly interested in two questions:

1. Given that the analytic–synthetic distinction is valid, is it applicable to propositions where one talks about a concept that is held together by family resemblance?
2. Could family resemblance be a possible line of argumentation against the distinction in the first place?

I'd also be thankful if you could point me to some authors that have discussed this connection.

I am currently writing a term paper that is dealing primarily with the analytic-synthetic distinction, however, a small part of it will be discussing the consequences it would have on Kant's philosophy if such a distinction were to turn out to be illusory. I have analysed Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism and one of the responses to it In Defense of a Dogma, but I am still unclear as to how all of this affects Kant's philosophy in The Critique of Pure Reason. If such a distinction were simply an illusion, as suggested by Quine, would it undermine Kant's philosophy in the rest of The Critique? Would it have much of an impact on Kant if we grant that Quine is right? I'm not so much concerned with whether or not Quine truly is correct, that I've already discussed. I'm more so concerned with, if we grant that he is correct, what impact will that have on Kant? I'm having trouble putting two and two together and would like to be pointed in the right direction.

Thank you

This is inspired by this youtube video.

From Wikipedia: > analytic proposition: a proposition whose predicate concept is contained in its subject concept

> synthetic proposition: a proposition whose predicate concept is not contained in its subject concept but related

I haven't read the Critique of Pure Reason myself, and I am unsure how exactly it is worded in it, but this definition from Wikipedia obviously leaves some question open: What's the definition of "concept", "contained in", "related"? The distinction is supposed to be easier to understand by looking at examples. (Just as a side note: If you need examples to define the idea that you are talking about, it is most likely not well-defined.)

Let's just assume the distinction is well-defined and look at an example that is listed on Wikipedia:

> All bachelors are unmarried.

According to Kant this is supposed be an analytic proposition, since the predicate ("unmarried") is contained in the subject ("bachelor"). Now, regarding the meaning of the term "contained in", it cannot depend on any linguistic variances, as we have to replace "bachelor" with "unmarried man", but the proposition stays analytic.

An example for an (a priori) synthetic proposition (from the video) is:

> The interior angles of a triangle sum to 180 degrees.

And the reasoning goes along these lines: "The concept of the interior angles of a triangle doesn't seem to implicitly contain the concept of exactly 180 degrees, at least not in the same simple sense that the concept of triangle contains the concept of three sides." This is where my problem with the distinction lies.

1. Let's define a triangle as a polygon made up of three straight lines (in Euclidean space). Then the concept of 180 degrees is apparently (according to the video) not contained in the concept of the interior angles of a triangle. Let's just assume this is right.

2. Let's define a triangle as a polygon made up of any number of straight lines having a sum of interior angles of 180 degrees. Then the concept 180 degrees is clearly contained in the concept of the interior angles of a triangle.

The first and second definition of triangle are exactly the same. A polygon is made up of three straight lines iff it is made up of any number of straight lines having a sum of interior angles of 180 degrees. We know that

E.g. Hume shows there is no rational justification for induction by arguing (among other things) that rational justification is either deductive or inductive; in the case of the justification for induction, it cannot be deductive since it's not necessarily true and it cannot be inductive since it would be begging the question.

E.g. Quine shows there is no analytic-synthetic distinction by arguing (among other things) that there is no non-circular definition of analyticity.

Both invoke an opposition to circularity/begging the question.

Why does it seem like negative theses tend to invoke such a technique?

Might there be nothing actually wrong with circularity/begging the question?

Obviously the analytic-synthetic distinction isn't uncontroversial (and I'm not sure that I have any kind of formed opinion on the issue) but for the sake of this question lets assume that I believe the distinction exists.

In the natural sciences, particularly in physics, theories are developed from postulates/assumptions, some of which are definitions of certain quantities. The example that I'll use here is:

• F = ma ; or
• F = dp/dt

Take your pick. This is Newton's second law and defines the definition of the quantity "force" in terms of the acceleration of a mass or rate the rate of change of momentum (they're equivalent). However, there have been some attempts to solve certain problems in physics by altering this definition. They haven't been very successful mind you but they're still there. I also remember reading on the SEP page for the Duhem-Quine thesis that the thesis implies that no postulate of a theory can be protected from empirical investigation - not even those postulates which are considered definitions.

So my question is, if F = ma is true by definition, how could altering this definition ever be useful for solving theoretical issues in physics and what kind of observations could ever convince us to alter these definitions. I can't think of any kind of observation which would imply that the statement "A bachelor is an unmarried man" is wrong. Is my physics example any different and if so, how so?

How do we decide which definition of a word to use when deciding if a statement is analytic or synthetic? For example, say we have the following statement: "The Empire State Building is 1454 feet tall." If the definition of the Empire State Building was "A famous building in New York city," then the statement would appear synthetic because the height isn't in the definition. But if the definition is "A building in New York City that is 1,454 feet tall," then it seems analytic.

Or take colors for example. Before the discovery of how wavelengths correspond to color, say the definition of red was "a color whose hue resembles that of blood or of the ruby ." Then afterward it may be defined differently as "an effect of light with a wavelength between 610 and 780 nanometers." Depending on which definition I use, my statement may be analytic or synthetic, which makes the distinction seem arbitrary.

I'm not trying to challenge any famous philosophers. I'm just trying to learn the concepts and see where I'm making an error.

Edit: not trying to challenge anybody

I get it; this is a really dumb way to ask a question. "If Plato was so influential, how come most philosophers don't believe in the forms?"

But seriously, Quine is super recent, and a lot of philosophers consider "Two Dogmas" to be the most influential paper of the 20th century. According to the PhilPapers Survey, 65% of philosophers believe in the distinction. Why is that? Does this imply that logical positivism hasn't really been disproved?

According to PhilPapers, 27% of philosophers reject the analytic-synthetic distinction. Why is that? I find it fairly intuitive that the propositions 'All apples are apple' and all 'All Bachelors are unmarried' are analytic and that 'All apples are red' and 'All bachelors are happy' are synthetic.

How well understood or employed was the analytic-synthetic distinction before Kant? The precursor to the analytic-synthetic distinction seems to come from Hume's division of knowledge into relations of ideas and matters of fact. But are there discussions and uses of it before Hume and Kant?

For instance, did Plato or Aristotle ever make use of the analytic-synthetic distinction (of course, in different terms)?

Thanks.

Hi there, so lately I've been reading a bit about Quine and have started his paper "Two Dogmas of Empricism" and I have a few questions:

a) Could someone please ELI5 Quine's rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction? (I understand it has something to do with the any definition of analyticity being circular, but a simple explanation would be helpful.)

b) What implications (if it is correct), does this rejection have with regards to: a) Kantian philosophy, and b) Frege's philosophy?

c) Within academic philosophy in this day and age, is Quine's rejection of the analytic-synthetic distinction considered true and/or valid?

Thanks.

Having studied some Epistemology, this distinction makes little sense to me. Firstly, I would assert that an object is defined, in part, by its physical characteristics, and all the concepts to do with its physical characteristics. Then consider a statement such as "The ball is green", generally accepted to be a synthetic statement. "The ball" actually refers to "This ball" or "This particular object", which, by definition, IS green, since it is part of its physical characteristics at that time. How then is the predicate adding anything to the subject? Any comments are greatly appreciated, and I'll try my best to clarify anything which seems incoherent in my statement.

I made a throwaway account because I'm not looking to have all the trolls you usually find on reddit fill my inbox with hatemail if I get something wrong*

First of all, I love Kant and even Descartes because they turned me onto epistemology. And the analytic-synthetic distinction and the a priori forms necessary to his transcendental idealism seems to make sense at first glance. But when you dig deeper into this distinction, synthetic a priori relies on "synonymy". I'm not arguing that mathematics (once learned) is not a priori (though the argument could be made) nor is basic logic not a priori as I've mentioned before (I agree with Kant here).

I'm talking about the "all bachelors are unmarried men" argument. The "a priori-ness" of that statement relies on the word "bachelor" meaning the same thing for everyone.

While I'm not going to claim or suggest that the meaning of bachelor to me is different than, say, someone else's definition. Maybe it will be a little more clear if I simply point to an example: What is feminism? We could look it up in the dictionary and use that as a foundation but my conceptualization of feminism is likely different than the dictionary definition. If my definition is at least somewhat shaped by my experiences and those of others, then this runs contrary to the a priori necessary conditions described by Kant.

For Kant's transcendental aesthetic to be valid, these concepts cannot be affected by observation (since they're a priori and necessary for observation or experience anyways) or rather, the validity of the analytical depends on the synthetic (the foundation).

Essentially, the truth of some sentences and words are wholly dependent upon how many people experience learning a language in the same way.

The more people learn a sentence is true, the more analytic the sentence.

Analytical is just a gradient depending on how many people experience learning a definition. This "a priori" distinction becomes less and less defined and the synthetic is shown to be just as dependent on experience as the analytical.

Thoughts?

This is a rather simplistic question but I found the following paragraph in a book:

>Putnam offers two kinds of argument for the entanglement thesis. One is a historical argument, the other is philosophical. The historical argument has it that the fact/value dichotomy is a child of another seemingly intuitive dichotomy, namely, the analytic/synthetic. Putnam alleges that the analytic/synthetic dichotomy has been undermined by Quine in his famous essay on ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ (Quine 1961) and concludes that therefore the fact/value dichotomy is without justification (Putman 2002: 30).

I scrolled down to references, and found this:

>Putnam, Hilary. 1975/1960. ‘Minds and Machines’. Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

>—1996/1974. ‘Philosophy and Our Mental Life’. In Modern Philosophy of Mind. William Lyons, ed. London: Everyman’s Press.

>—1997. ‘James’s Theory of Truth’. In The Cambridge Companion to William

Unfortunately, none of these are from 2002, am I just being really silly - or if not, what is the article in which Hilary Putnam demonstrates that the fact/value dichotomy is a child of the analytic/synthetic dichotomy?

The last set generated some good discussion, so I'm gonna continue it.

(The PhilPapers survey gives options like "lean toward", "lean against", and so on: it does not have to be a binary yes/no.)

From https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/#IntDis

> Compare the following two sets of sentences:

> I. > > (1) Some doctors that specialize on eyes are rich. > > (2) Some ophthalmologists are rich. > > (3) Many bachelors are ophthalmologists. > > (4) People who run damage their bodies. > > (5) If Holmes killed Sikes, then Watson must be dead. > > II. > > (6) All doctors that specialize on eyes are doctors. > > (7) All ophthalmologists are doctors. > > (8) All bachelors are unmarried. > > (9) People who run move their bodies. > > (10) If Holmes killed Sikes, then Sikes is dead.

> Most competent English speakers who know the meanings of all the constituent words would find an obvious difference between the two sets: whereas they might wonder about the truth or falsity of those of set I, they would find themselves pretty quickly incapable of doubting those of II. Unlike the former, these latter seem to be known automatically, “just by virtue of knowing just what the words mean,” as many might spontaneously put it. Indeed, a denial of any of them would seem to be in some important way unintelligible, very like a contradiction in terms. Although there is, as we shall see, a great deal of dispute about these italicized ways of drawing the distinction, and even about whether it is real, philosophers standardly refer to sentences of the first class as “synthetic,” those of the second as (at least apparently) “analytic.” Many philosophers have hoped that the apparent necessity and a priori status of the claims of logic, mathematics and much of philosophy would prove to be due to these claims being analytic, i.e., explaining why such claims seemed to be true “in all possible worlds,” and knowable to be so “independently of experience.” This view has led them to regard philosophy as consisting in large part in the “analysis” of the meanings of the relevant claims, words and concepts (hence “analytic” philosophy, although the term has long ceased to have any such specific commitment, and refers now more generally to philosophy done in the associated closely reasoned style).

This seems like a very objectivist way to define a concept. It starts using units, in this case sentences, finds key differences between them and then generalizes those differences into a concept. I don't think Rand ever described a case where going through this exercise with any chosen set of un

I know this is probably a silly question, I think I'm missing the obvious, but in 'Two Dogmas' Quine says that Carnap requires the analytic/synthetic distinction to 'preserve a double standard for ontological questions and scientific hypotheses' and I'm sort of failing to see why? Based on 'empiricism, semantics, ontology' it seems that Carnap is discussing linguistic frameworks and classifies questions into intra/extra-systemic categories and I'm not really seeing how this depends on the analytic:synthetic distinction? I mean I get that he says that the answers to some metaphysical questions in the internal sense is analytic but I'm failing to see how blurring the analytic:synthetic distinction ruins his case? I'm currently trying to write my paper for a course in Analytic philosophy and I'm struggling with some of the concepts so I was hoping someone could point me in the right direction. Sorry if it all seems a bit too needy, have been trying to read Carnap, Quine and Huw Price to make sense of it all but I'm still a bit lost with the concepts.

I.e. why exactly is this needed in order for the verifiability theory of meaning to actually work? Why does Quine believe that without this distinction, the logical positivists can no longer make a distinction between meaningful and meaningless propositions?

In other words, if all sentences are synthetic, why does Quine believe that the empiricist can no longer discount metaphysics or religion as being meaningless?

One of the main components of the logical positivism movement is that they distinguish analytic from synthetic propositions. I understand what the distinction is, but what I don't get is why this distinction is important. Moreover, why does Quine's Two Dogmas of Empiricism, which shows that there is no true line between analytic/synthetic statements, disprove logical positivism?

Quine argues that some propositions can be analytical or empirical, and therefore no dichotomy can be drawn between them. And to my understanding the consensus is that this is true.

Does anyone here think that Quine was wrong and that Ayer successfully refutes Quine in his second edition of LTL?

When philosophers like Quine talk about the analytic-synthetic distinction not having epistemological significance. What exactly do they mean by significance?

I figure it means:

1. The statement in question gives knowledge.

2. The type of knowledge given differs (epistemological difference) between the two types of statement.

But what if we believe that statements don't give knowledge but merely describe it? That the analytic-synthetic distinction has no epistemological significance only linguistic or semantic significance?

From a naturalist perspective could we say that knowledge is gained from sensory faculties, and that we treat our sense of reason as a faculty which does not need to be understood or explained in order to be acknowledged as a source of knowledge (a black box if you will). These faculties have epistemological significance. The terms "analytic-synthetic" are merely language used to describe this distinction. There is, after all, a distinction to be made, for the purposes of language and communication and just being orderly in general, in the knowledge gained from our reason versus the knowledge gained from our senses.

I think Kant described a good deal of the difference between the two when he tried to come up with "synthetic a priori" and discussed our conceptions of space and time as forms of our intuition. I'm not sure I agree with where he went with that but it's clear there are differences between the knowledge gained from what we might call our reason and our normal sensory faculties and that perhaps, maybe on some fundamental level the a priori and a posteriori distinction disappears but for all intents and purposes it's much easier to use this terminology to describe and communicate knowledge. Our experience has shown us what we call analytic a priori statements are to be trusted in a different way.

So I would say we can gain knowledge from one of two faculties. Our reason or our senses. Knowledge from reason, if it hinges on sensory experience, is through inductive reasoning. Otherwise it is deductive reasoning. Reason, unlike the eyes, ears, etc is like a black box as far as I'm concerned. We know it's there, we know it takes input and gives output, we don't know anything more than that, definitively speaking. Kant was on to something with the forms of intuition but we don't know how far those go.

Logic, mathematics, etc are things we associate with analyticity in distinction with synthetic statements because they ar

How does Quine's attack on the analytic synthetic distinction and his attack on a priori knowledge affect the Kantian notion that the source of ethics is rational thought? It seems at first glance that if Quine is right, that there are no purely a priori truth and judgements, then the source of Kantian ethics is undermined, or at least falsifiable to empirical observations. Does accepting one really entails the rejection of the other?

Hi guys,

Not sure how to interpret this claim.

(A). They are indistinct such that they amount to the same claim prima-facie, this is a contradiction if you hold the classical definitions.

(B) Analytic truths are truths internally consistent: they don't need any exterior justification; so removing the distinction entails a-posteriori truths are also internally consistent.

(C) Analytic truths are admitted to our ontology a-posteriori (they are contingently true); but then if mathematical truths are necessary this seems modally confused (how can something be necessary and contingent).

Help?

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Based on Moores intuitionism in which he says that ‘good is good’ the same way that yellow is yellow we can assume that we don’t need further empirical evidence to base our morals on. However, Ayer’s emotivism collects the 3 schools of moral statements : analytic (logical, self evident statements), synthetic ( requires further investigation from sensory experiences) and then moral statements. But if they are compared to intuitionism would you say that Moore saying ‘good is good’ would be analytic as it is true by definition or synthetic as it requires further evidence of what ‘good’ is. I personally can understand both interpretations ,but for me synthetic seems to make more sense as we need to understand the context of good to understand his statement. Any other interpretations would be welcome as I need help deciphering which one it would be.

The last set generated some good discussion, so I'm gonna continue it.

(The PhilPapers survey gives options like "lean toward", "lean against", and so on: it does not have to be a binary yes/no.)