Consequentialism Puns

Is it true that there is a certain kind of person who is attracted to the quasi-scientific, systemizing theory of morality known as (rule) utilitarianism? If so, what kind of person is that, and why do you find it attractive? Or is it more likely that the effective altruism movement and people like Peter Singer have influenced it? I am going to start by identifying what I think are the strongest motivations for utilitarian theorizing, and then I am going to explain a series of problems that I don't think there are good answers for.

Most rationalists I have asked about the subject tell me their interest in utilitarianism largely comes down to their theoretical preference parsimony--"it boils everything down to once clear principle." Which is strange, seeing as consequentialism is a pluralistic theory that encompasses more than one starting variable. Pleasure and pain are morally relevant--and, for utilitarians, relative impartiality in the distribution of utilities is also thought to matter, which is yet another principle.

As someone who already acknowledges the intrinsic significance of more than one moral factor, it should not be hard for a utilitarian to appreciate the appeal of counting further factors as being morally fundamental (i.e. by saying that, even when consequences are the same or worse, considerations of honesty, bodily autonomy rights, promises, special relationships, reciprocity after acceptance of benefits, etc. can tip the moral scales in favor of some action). If you doubt that pleasure and pain are distinct experiences and moral granules, consider whether a state of consciousness with zero experience of pleasure is one of great pain, rather than simply one of no pleasure. It seems implausible to think that such a state is impossible, or that it would be agonizing.

The misgiving I have about this is that parsimony (even in science) is only an explanatory virtue if it actually is explanatory; no scientist would prefer a more parsimonious theory that explains away the evidence to a theory that acknowledges it. A really parsimonious theory of everything investigated by science would be to deny the phenomena even exist in the first place, and are just illusions created by a mad scientist stimulating our brains: the earth was created 9 minutes ago with a false appearance of age, and the objects in your everyday life aren't real. This theory posits far fewer entities in order to generate an explanation when compared to the "re

MacIntyre in After Virtue wants to illustrate virtue ethics by the example of a child playing chess. If it's just after the reward (e.g. a candy for winning), it will have an incentive to cheat. However, if it's genuinely interested in playing chess, it would only rob itself by cheating, instead of playing properly, learning from its mistakes and becoming actually good at the practice which is playing chess.

But... once the child is very good at chess, shouldn't it be able to make rules and recommendations like "If your opponent does X, then doing Y is the optimal choice" or write a book about chess playing incorporating many strategies which would, if applied, make one as good as the child player or at least better than before?

Heck, even the claim that there's cheating at all seems to imply that there are right and wrong things to do in chess and if I want to get good at it, I need to respect these rules and not cheat. But if that's the case for virtue ethics and I can only become virtuous (good at chess) by acting virtuously (respecting the rules of chess), then how do I know how to act to become virtuous in the first place (how do I learn the rules of chess? How do I know if I'm cheating or playing right?).

It seems weird that people just accept it as a brute fact that virtuous people can't articulate the reasons why they do the things they do to non-virtuous people (do they? Are they?). Who makes the decision when someone is considered virtuous? What's the underlying principle? Why can't it be passed on to other non-virtuous people, so they can start acting morally without the trouble of trial-and-error a virtuous person seems to undergo? How does the person wanting to become virtuous even know that an act was not virtuous but vicious and that he shouldn't do it again?

How is the dialogue of A saying "Torturing others for fun is not a thing a virtuous person would do." and B saying "But it totally is!" or C saying "There's no telos and thus no virtuous person insofar as it would be a person who has realized his telos" different from A' saying "Torturing others for fun is wrong!" and B' saying "But it's totally right!" or C saying "There's no wrongness!". How is it less arbitrary, so that MacIntyre can actually argue that it would solve the "culture of emotivism" which modern moral philosophy caused?

I would get virtue ethics if it would simply state "By acting like an ethical principle is correct, I will internalize its tenets and my desires will

Hi,

I am wondering how morality is different from rule Consequentialism.

I appreciate there are different forms of morality such as desert, utilitarian and deonotolocial)

What are some things that are important to consider.

Thought I'd post here an explanation of an idea I had a few months ago and which I have been mulling over since. So far I haven't really found any objections so I thought opening a discussion here might be a good shout.

I suppose the idea sprung out of re-considering the 'impossibility of predicting consequences' objection to consequentialism and specifically utilitarianism. Briefly, this argument says that consequentialist ethical theories are no good because predicting the consequences of our actions is extremely difficult and we would need to be some sort of omniscient observer to make reliable moral judgements. Call this is the 'epistemic indeterminacy' criticism.

Considering utilitarianism not as a practical tool towards making the world a better place as Bentham may have done but as a description of moral facts, this argument doesn't seem to get off the ground. Our actions still have consequences, even if we can't know about them precisely. It might mean that we aren't very competent moral judges, but it doesn't mean that the moral dimension of our acts isn't entirely determined by the consequences.

In my assessment, this line of argument starts to fall apart if we modify the epistemic indeterminacy criticism and replace it instead with what I'm calling the 'metaphysical indeterminacy' criticism.

If we assume metaphysical indeterminism, then the future, and therefore the consequences, don't really exist. Instead, countless, (perhaps an infinite number under some models) of futures exist, with one of many simply waiting to be instantiated by probability and happenstance.

This is dangerous for consequentialism because it means that no physically possible future is more real than another, and therefore no consequence of any action is more real than another. The consequences of an action are in flux, and will never stop being in flux; as by some fluke of probability it is always possible that any action could cause the most immense torment, or the most immense happiness.

So as far as I can tell, if metaphysical indeterminism is true then not only are the consequences of actions impossible to predict, but they are literally not real (yet). To me it looks like consequentialism and metaphysical indeterminism are logically incompatible; or strict determinism is a necessary condition for the truth of consequentialism.

That points are awarded for your actions, which then decides where you end up, is very one-dimensional and transactional. The case of Mindy St Claire especially, one good can balance out all the many bads.

These are the terms we keep dancing around in the debates over whether Heroes are actually defined by a sense of right and wrong, and why we (myself included!) seem to keep talking past each other.

Deontology: it is better to undertake morally good actions. The intent of the action matters more.

Consequentialism: it is better to undertake actions that will lead to good results. The outcome of the action matters more.

These are the two major schools of ethics, and are often very much at odds. Also note that neither of these categories explores what "good actions" or "good results" actually are, and each have tremendous variety within them (and of course aren't a neat binary). For example, you can care about helping the disadvantaged and take deontological actions that might lead one to selling possessions to care for the poor, or consequentialist ones that lead one to find a high-paying job and donating more money to charity. Or you can have more negative versions of the same (also trying to do Good). Deontology: extreme religious zealotry (in pursuit of letting more people get into heaven) causing mass-murder in a crusade. Consequentialism: stopping the spread of Stalinist communism (very bad murderous worldview) causing your country to support anti-soviet dictators.0.0

But many people tend to be very definite about their views on this spectrum and have trouble understanding different positions on it. So for example, I lean consequentialist, and therefore can't think of William "Turn 100000 People Into Mindless Zombies For Their Own Good" as anything other than small-e evil. But it underlies a whole lot of our (the community's) disagreement on the Red Axe situation. If you truly believe it is more morally correct to let millions die (at which point, the Story will allow Good to Prevail) rather than make any compromise with Evil, then you're going to have a lot of trouble coming to terms with someone who's willing to compromise every principle if that's what it'll take to allow those millions to live free, happy lives. And vice versa.

They're just two totally incompatible ideas of what Good is.

In response to the stream on Dec 26 where Vaush discussed if ncation is morally wrong under utilitarianism:

Consequentialism is not about what things are right and wrong. It's about the best outcome and how close the world is to that outcome. Personal ethics is about what society calls "right" and "wrong" while actually about what society encourages and discourages. Personal ethics are not morality at all. They are a societal tool to achieve a better moral result. Personal ethics mimics the language of morality because other ethical systems don't distinguish the two. This is all something that Vaush may realize but does not know how to articulate. Sadly, this does not completely answer what should be discouraged, you need to know a lot about society and which discouragements will produce the best results to do that, but it is an essential step there.

What's more important? Actions or intentions?

I'd say knowledge...

If I knew how I could make you happier I'd act that way. I'd do anything for your happiness... that's what matters the most to me.

Parlé avec moi. Je t'attendrai.

I have the view that actions are not moral or immoral in of themselves but must be judged according to their expected consequences. Lying is generally regarded as immoral but I don't think it is inherently immoral to lie if more good comes out of it than harm. For example, if I was sheltering Jews in my house in 1944 Germany, I would lie to any officials that question me about Jews in my house. Note that by consequences I mean expected consequences as in it would be the best choice to bet $50 that I wouldn't roll a 6 on a dice, and even if I roll a 6 later that doesn't make my choice wrong since it was more likely that I don't roll a 6.

I think our current political landscape puts too much emphasis on ideology, and not enough on pragmatism and consequences. This is an issue on both sides in which people will blindly support party platforms without critically examining what the effects are. In my opinion, this is stupid and we should only be looking at the consequences of an act. In regards to liberals/Democrats in the US, I honestly think they need to stop with the identity politics (which don't accomplish anything but only divide people) and worry about actual issues facing this nation. I am completely for many of their policies (e.g. tackling climate change, abortion rights, universal healthcare, ending the War on Drugs). However, some of the things they advocate I see as impractical and/or irrelevant. I hear cries of "Defund the police" but many liberals have no idea how chill our police are. How about you go to Russia where the police regularly extort innocent people? I understand the need for reform in our police system, and peaceful protests are good, but riots are not (and believe me, I have seen riots). Often the media twists many shooting cases and makes the person killed more of a victim than they actually are. Against an armed person (even with a knife), it's hard to blame the police for shooting. It's true that some shooting victims such as Breonna Taylor are indeed unarmed and innocent but the media often conflates armed people with such victims. I also honestly think, from a practical standpoint, if we truly want to improve race relations, we should ignore race in these conversations and try to see things from a more colorblind perspective. Putting the spotlight on race only heightens racial tensions. Out of sight, out of mind.

What are your thoughts on all this?

From what i've read, rule consequentialism is when certain actions are always wrong, when they usually lead to negative consequences.

Isn't this the same as kantianism? Who suggests that if an action would usually lead to negative consequences, then that action is bad.

is the difference just that kant emphasises the action whereas rule consequentialism emphasises the consequence?

I have read the Stanford Encyclopedia article and I know that JS Mill is controversially considered a rule consequentialist, but who is unarguably the earliest rule consequentialist (which I presume would be post JS Mill)?

What book or academic article do you recommend to further understand rule consequentialism? There are too many references in the SEP article and no definitive guide in what to pick up.

Edit: changed the second paragraph.

To those who have a background in ethics, or even better, have significant knowledge of consequentialism, are there any papers that cover the connection between act-consequentialism's considering all outcomes and action-guiding understood as performing the action that one has most reason to do?

Here is what I am thinking: if actions are guided under act-consequentialism in the sense that one ought to perform the action one has most reason to do, and one has most reason to perform the action with the best consequences, all things considered, then act-consequentialism has some kind of special connection between rational reasons and the morally required action. But I am struggling to find any papers that talk about this specific issue (in act-consequentialism).

Can someone point me in the right direction? Or perhaps someone can explain why, if there are no papers on this topic, that such a connection would be either i) obvious and not warranting further discussion or ii) not obvious and contentious for some reason?

Hey gang.

I love the Alignment system. But not everyone feels that way, perhaps not even Wizard of the Coast themselves, who, over the years, have moved more and more to be in line with the general consensus of their player-base, the majority of which seems to dislike the Alignment system (though rarely manages to put in exact words why). The aim of this post will not be to force those who dislike Alignment to change their mind, but rather to offer an explanation as to why I, for one, love the Alignment system. And to do that, I'll be using two other things I love: Philosophy, and Magic: the Gathering.

GOOD vs EVIL

In D&D in general and in my campaigns in particular, the Moral Axis (Good <-> Evil) represents first and foremost an axis between Altruism <-> Egocentrism. This nerdy debate is reminiscent of the comments made by Mark Rosewater, Head Designer of Magic the Gathering, on the philosophical opposition between the colors Black and White in Magic the Gathering: (https://magic.wizards.com/en/articles/archive/making-magic/pie-fights-2016-11-14).

For those of you who have better things do with their lives than debate the morality of trading card games (lol), one of his main arguments is this:

White believes the strong have a moral duty to protect the weak. The good of the group is more valuable than the good of the individual, and helping the weak (at no small cost to the strong) allows for the rise of a society that is both fair and just. White claims that if the strong don't help the weak, the result is an unjust (and, more importantly, unstable) society.

Black believes that the strong have a moral duty to exploit the weak. The good of the individual is more important than the good of the group, and helping the weak (at no small cost to the strong) limits the latter's potential, weakens the group as a whole, and worse still reinforces the status of victims that the weak bear, a status that they could rid themselves of, if they were only willing to take power, through force or trickery. Black claims that if the strong exploit the weak, the result is a meritocracy where the most competent people reign, and where they have the ability to provide for the group as a whole.

In this analogy, White represents the Good alignment, and Black represents the Evil alignment. A Good character can want something that many might consider to be im

So Kant is usually taken to be the arch-deontologist of moral philosophy. The wiki page on Kant's categorical imperative includes the paragraph:

>We ought to act only by maxims that would harmonize with a possible kingdom of ends. We have perfect duty not to act by maxims that create incoherent or impossible states of natural affairs when we attempt to universalize them, and we have imperfect duty not to act by maxims that lead to unstable or greatly undesirable states of affairs.

Is this an accurate summary of Kant's thought? If so, doesn't this reduce Kant's categorical imperative to a kind of consequentialism or utilitarianism? Because before taking any action we will have to do a consequentialist calculation to determine whether or not it will result in an "unrealisable" or "undesirable" state of affairs. It doesn't matter if we have e.g. a duty not to kill someone, if not killing them will have the consequence of derailing the Kingdom of Ends.

https://reddit.com/r/PhilosophyofReligion/comments/mhebud/_/gsz7z39/?context=1

You couldn’t even make this shit up.

can we say that the meaning of what's good is what produce good consequences

or Am I confused?

because moral theories don't answer meta-ethical questions !?

I am currently researching a specific objection to consequentialism, namely that consequentialism does not leave adequate room for personal relationships (friendships, lovers, etc). I have been informed that Scheffler, among others, criticizes consequentialism in this way, but I am at a loss as to where in his work he makes this criticism. Reading through The Rejection of Consequentialism did not leave me with any specific discussion on this criticism, nor Human Morality. Is this specific criticism found in a separate paper? If so, which paper? If not, is this criticism intended to be *implicit* in his work?

Edit: Perhaps there is other terminology that Scheffler uses instead of "friendship" or "relationships." If so, knowing the relevant terms that Scheffler uses will aid in resolving my search for his criticism.

I don't see why suffering should be on it's own should be prioritized more than happiness or well being. I think reduction in owns well being to reduce suffering should be preferred (especially since reducing others suffering tends to make you happier) should be done but only to a certain extent.

An example is that demonstrates this intuition. By driving cars we are causing crashes that will kill some people and cause suffering we could reduce this by outlawing them or making the speed limit 5mph. But the well being benefit seems to out way the suffering it harms.

I will say I am agnostic on whether suffering and happiness are two different things or just a degree of one.

I feel like I'm crazy when I see people ask this on the Vegan Sub and the only responses they seem to dodge the premise, so I came here.

The definition a lot of Vegans use is that "Veganism is a philosophy and way of living which seeks to exclude—as far as is possible and practicable—all forms of exploitation of, and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any other purpose"

I find this a bit wanting, in the sense that it creates many loop-holes. By the logic of this statement, possible and practicable can mean anything without a proper measure to help anchor it. Even meat eaters are vegan by this definition. To me, the definition should either be more well-defined or it should shift towards a more deontological sort of ruling. Maybe the definition that states animals should not be seen as a commodity is a more reasonable one, for instance.

The reason I mention altruism and consequentialism in the title is because I feel as though both the new "Effective Altruism" movement and other philosophies like utilitarianism hold a very similar, if not, identical issue. Their lack of an upper-limit seems a bit... hard to practice, or at least, hard to make sense of.

Please, tell me if I'm being unreasonable or missing something glaring here.

Some philosophers, Stocker and Scheffler, have critiqued traditional consequentialist moral theories because they fail to leave adequate room for loving relationships or personal friendships. I'm curious of this: how successful people think these particular objections are? And what responses by consequentialists do you think most successfully address the issue of relationships and friendships (if it's even an issue at all)?

I'm interested in original opinions about the success of these objections as well as any consequentialist philosophers that have responded directly to the matter.

Most of us are pragmatic consequentialists; we believe in evidence-based policies that reduce human suffering to the greatest extent possible. However, there are undoubtedly other important factors that must be taken into account in building successful societies. For instance, Amartya Sen argues against pure utilitarianism by looking at the phenomenon of hedonic adaptation. He suggests that people can be happy in what can be seen as objectively undesirable conditions, like slavery and poverty. In other words, "the underdog learns to bear the burden so well that he or she overlooks the burden itself". Hence, it is arguably important to value such notions as individual autonomy and freedom of speech in and of themselves, irrespective of how they impact human pleasure and satisfaction.

Philosophically, does the neoliberal movement account for this?

Recently I have been thinking about my personal ethical framework. I came to the conclusion that I am willing to acts in the interest of other beings, but only up to a certain point.

We could say that an egoist individual will choose their actions such that they maximize their personal utility of "x", regardless of what utility value "y" other agents have for that action. However, say we have a given threshold value "t", 0 < t < 1, for which an individual chooses the action in its own interest when t*x > y. I.e. if my "t" was 0.5, that would mean that I would act in my own interest if the utility I gain is at least half the utility other agents gain, but if my utility is less than half of theirs, I will act in the interest of the other agents. Has this idea been explored? (My guess is yes since it's quite basic, but I couldn't find it online).

This framework is helping me understand my own choices. For instance, I believe that the personal negative utility I have for becoming vegan is less than the positive utility it has for other agents. Now, I have to decide on some value of "t" (which I of course can't express for myself in some constant number, I am just weighing different interests mentally). If my value of "t" is such that t*x > y, I should not become vegan, otherwise I should. I can then make similar judgements for other actions, like donating to charity. Do you have any thoughts or corrections on this?

I recognize that most people will find this a nonstarter, but I'm interested in attempts to find a middle ground between Kantian ethics and consequentialism -- or more precisely, an interpretation of Kant that opens him up to some form of consequentialism. (Any such interpretation will have to stray quite far away from the source material, of course, but that, to me, is part of the fun!)

I ran across this idea in Shelly Kagan's "Kantianism for Consequentialists," and he cites two other sources: David Cummiskey's Kantian Consequentialism and R. M. Hare's "Could Kant Have Been a Utilitarian?" Before I dive too deep into any of these, I'm curious to know if there are other sources that people here would recommend. Thanks in advance!

Do you use an ethical system to make decisions about what is right or wrong? If so, what is it? Why do you use it? Is just true for just for you or for everyone? Meaning, should everyone use the ethical system you are using?

Consequentialists always shame non-consequentialists. I have been told: "consequentialism follows common sense. If the point is not to consider consequences and reduce suffering, then what is? What moral philosophy makes the most sense? You're just trying to make yourself feel good while not actually doing anything about consequences and suffering. Moral theories that are not consequentialist are flawed. It is easy to demonstrate. Would your non-consequentialist moral beliefs indicate that it is alright to make 100 people suffer to "save" one person? No, therefore theories that are not consequentialist do not support most people's moral beliefs and are wrong. Most people would not agree with making 100 people suffer for 1 person. But they would agree with making 1 person suffer for 100 people. Most people are a consequentialist one way or another

This also begs the question of how one determines what rules to follow in a non-consequentialist framework. How are those rules not based on expected consequences? And how would they make sense without caring about consequences?

I have no desire to follow a non-consequentialist philosophy. That just isn't convincing"

Can you help me? I'm stuck. What are the arguments against consequentialism? How do non-consequentialist frameworks make sense? Aren't they there to just make us feel better about ourselves? Where do non-consequentialist rules come from? Aren't they "do this because I say so" if they don't care about consequence?

If by not doing something to someone, 100 people end up suffering, why wouldn't I be at fault for that?

Consequentialism: Actions which produce good effects are good.

Deontology: Actions whose intentions are to produce good effects are good.

How can consequentialism work at all without absolute knowledge of the effects of an action? For instance I can't save a person's life because I don't know with certainty that saving that person would have good effects. It could just so happen that due to the butterfly effect saving that person will cause 5 more people to die in the distant future.

If the answer is that an agent acting under consequentialism should just act according to their best beliefs about the effects of an action, then I don't see how that is any different than deontology. Intentions are dependent on the beliefs about the effects of an action.

Something has been bugging me when it comes to consequentialism, or anything that takes consequences into consideration. Imagine a scenario in which someone named A is born with the desires and tendencies to steal, rape, etc, suffers greatly when they do not commit these immoral actions, and can not mentally feel better no matter what therapies or methods of rehabilitation are used. Wouldn't stopping this individual from committing immoral acts be immoral because it makes them suffer?

Or in the case where someone else named B does commit immoral acts, and is thrown in prison where they are locked up and therefore suffer mentally, isn't imprisonment immoral for making them suffer?

But if we want to argue it's not immoral at all for them to suffer, we should ignore the consequences.

According to what moral/ethical theories, is stopping these individuals, A and B, from committing immoral acts moral and justified, even if the methods used make them suffer in return? As in, them suffering wouldn't matter?

A better question would be: In what ethical theories, are consequences irrelevant? What are the arguments for such theories, and against consequentialism?

How can the moral theories in which consequences are irrelevant be justified? For instance, according to consequentialism, punching someone, theft, etc would be bad because of the consequences they have, but if we ignore the consequences, how can punching someone, theft, etc be bad? Why would punching someone, theft, etc be bad in the first place? "Punching, theft, etc is bad" ... because?