Can something with no phenomenal consciousness still have beliefs?

Is there a relation between J.L. Mackies argument from queerness and the hard problem of consciousness? Mackies claim that moral statements don't correspond with something material seems trivial, but the same is true for all human beliefs, hopes, wants etc... Would it make sense to lump moral statements in with all other beliefs and to accept them if consciousness/the mind is accepted?

I have been trying to find a way to explain why senses following propositional attitude reports cannot be substituted with different senses with the same referent. Somewhere in here I feel I am missing a key part but it's just not clicking. Here is what I have written and I am using the Babylon example but cannot connect the last dots without feeling I messed up earlier on.

"In sentences of the form ‘A believes that S’ there exists a problem where both premises can be true yet the conclusion false. Using Frege’s terms of sense we see that the sense of the Hesperus differs from the sense of Phosphorus, even though they share the same referent. As a result, Hesperus=Hesperus differs in cognitive value from Hesperus=Phosphorus. This difference in senses has more implications when attached to propositional attitude reports. In the sentence, Babylon believes Hesperus=Hesperus, ‘believes’ serves as connection from “Babylon” to “Hesperus=Hesperus” and this statement exists as its own concept with sense and truth value. We can assume this to be true, as well as a premise Hesperus=Phosphorus (due to it being an identity statement), but we cannot account for a conclusion that Babylon believes Hesperus=Phosphorus as the senses of Hesperus and Phosphorus are no longer denoting the same thing when mapped to Babylon using ‘believes.’ "

I recently read Quine’s paper “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes”, and I want to make sure that I’m understanding his position correctly:

Quine, it seems to me, is suspicious of interpreting propositional attitudes de re due to their “referential opacity”, that is, it is ambiguous what exactly a given propositional attitude refers to. A consequence of this ambiguousness (for Quine) is skepticism with regard to “quantifying in” to a belief statement, that is, assigning a value to a bound variable which is the object of belief, for such a move appears to lead to contradictions. Therefore, Quine suggests interpretation of propositional attitudes de dicto, that is “notionally”, rather than “referentially”. This is problematic for Quine, however, since he is (rather notoriously) a “confirmed extensionalist”. Due to this commitment to extensionalism and the apparent irreducibility of propositional attitudes (and other intensional terms) to an extensional idiom through de re interpretation, Quine is skeptical of propositional attitudes, for they appear a) potentially contradictory under a de re interpretation and b) irreducibly intensional under a de dicto interpretation.

Is this a correct interpretation of Quine’s position with regard to propositional attitudes, or am I missing something here?

Hello all, I want to make sure I am not running afoul of standard first-order logic by formalizing propositional attitudes in something like the following way:

∃x[knows(x, P)] or "There exists an agent x that knows P." (Or, perhaps even more granularly: ∃x[knows(x, P(x))] Is this more granular attempt scary because we are venturing into a kind of quantified modal logic?)

I am concerned whether this is actually a second-order statement of some kind, even though I do not seem to be quantifying over predicates!

Second, in epistemic logic, the preferred notation is something like: K_x P (where K is "knows", x is some agent in subscript, and P is some proposition).

In a sentence, is it the case that these two are equivalent?

K_a P <=> knows(a, P)

Finally, if I may: most examples in epistemic logic resources do not seem to quantify over agents. However, is the following permissible?

∀x[K_x P] "For all agents x, x knows that P"

Thanks in advance.

cc: /u/suipy

I think I'm going to stick to the schedule and get my Fodor on this week! I plan to post content when I finish reading the article. Feel free to continue the discussion on Sellars as well, I will engage in either post.

Hope you're all staying safe and surviving the apocalypse.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/frege/#FreLan

>John believes that Mark Twain wrote Huckelberry Finn.

>Mark Twain = Samuel Clemens.

>Therefore, John believes that Samuel Clemens wrote Huckelberry Finn.

>This argument is not valid

Not sure why this argument is invalid. Is it because belief isn't transitive?

EDIT: -1 Propositional in the Title

It has been argued that the following is invalid, mainly because of substitution failures in propositional attitude attributions.

John knows that Hesperus is the planet Venus

Hesperus = Phosphorous

Therefore, John knows Phosphorous is the planet Venus

It has been argued that because of the invalidity of this argument. The two sentences 'Hesperus is the planet Venus' and 'Phosphorous is the planet Venus' must differ in cognitive value. Which explains why it seems one could assent to one of them and not the other.

Couldn't we just makes this argument valid as follows and reject that they differ in cognitive value?

John knows that Hesperus is the planet Venus

Hesperus = Phosphorous

John is aware that Hesperus = Phosphorous (that they are co-referring terms)

Therefore, John knows Phosphorous is the planet Venus

Or we could also say:

John knows that Hesperus is the planet Venus

Hesperus = Phosphorous

John is unaware that Hesperus = Phosphorous (that they are co-referring terms)

Therefore, John does not know that Phosphorous is the planet Venus

This solution seems too simple to me so I'm thinking there must be a problem with it but I can't see it. I guess they would still differ in cognitive value, For John, on my view, but this would only be because he is unaware that they refer to the same object. Not because they differ in sense, as Frege suggested. I think what I'm saying is, isn't the problem just with Johns lack of knowledge rather than the meaning of the two terms?

Any thoughts?

I'm curious if people have thoughts on why lots of folks think it's apt to treat desire as a propositional attitude.

To be more clear, I think I am somewhat familiar with some of the surrounding literature. So, I've read my Russell, Michael Smith, Ben-yami, Talbot Brewer, William Lycan, Davidson, Searle, Stalnaker, Velleman, Strawson.

And so, yeah, some people critique such things. But the prevailing thought seems to be to treat them as propositional. But, I guess I am just wondering if people more familiar with propositional attitudes in general have some thoughts here. Like, what's the advantage? Before Russell, no one seemed to think like this. But by now it's the standard way of thinking of them. Is there some "knock-down" argument I missed that inclines people to do so?

Started reading the literature on belief and propositions but it's not clear to me what the propositional attitude is when somebody does not believe a proposition. X believes S can mean X's attitude towards S is that S is true, or X's disposition is to act as if S is true. But suppose X doesn't believe S or lacks a belief S is true. Then what is X's attitude or disposition towards?

If beliefs are structured mental representations or dispositions to act that support other beliefs, then it seems to me that 'X does not believe S' actually describes an attitude or disposition 'X believes ~S.'

Suppose I don't believe Santa Claus exists. Then if I see a man in a red suit emerging from my chimney with a sack of toys, my attitude or disposition will be to think or act as if the man is not actually Santa (and likely a burglar or prankster or something.)

My inference M that 'This man is not Santa' is supported by another proposition S', namely 'Santa Claus doesn't exist.' If I didn't have this proposition as part of my representation of the world then I would not have anything to support my attitude or disposition towards M being true. Logically you can't make a valid inference to a conclusion from a false premise.

So is it that if I don't believe a proposition, my attitude or disposition is actually a belief in its negation?

I'm aware of how the downfall of 'folk psychology' is said to lead to throwing out propositional attitudes as a way of doing logic and epistemology. Have any alternatives been seriously developed? I know this view has been considered by some to lead to skepticism even, any recommendations of readings for this side as well?

DOI: 10.4324/9780415249126-V028-1

URL: https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/propositional-attitudes/v-1

I'm trying to wrap my head around Fodor's model, and am struggling with it, so I was hoping someone could clear this up.

Maybe you have recently come across new evidence that contradicts a belief you once held, or you came to examine an assumption you had accepted uncritically. Perhaps this was because you came across new evidence through a book, essay, podcast, conversation, or because you had one or multiple experiences that shifted your attitude (rather than a particular propositional belief) or the approach you take toward some issue.

What did you change your mind about? And what precipitated the change?

Well, the actual passage is: in psychological reality “a proposition can only lay claim to significance if the obverse of its meaning can also be accepted as valid” (“Fundamental Questions in Psychotherapy” CW v16 para. 236; trans. mod.). I take this as Jung's way of saying that psychological existence is fundamentally governed by what he calls the "law of opposites," which naturally doesn't always take us places we want to go, or which feel "ethical." In my experience a lot of people have trouble accepting this, because it's a simple law which fundamentally questions any possible ethical belief in human experience.

I've been busy with my own work lately and have missed much of the discussion and moderation that has been going on regarding the activity of /u/georges_perec, and /u/jorge_luis_borges.

This post is an amalgamation of two posts I just made, but are buried in other threads.

I don't believe such a thing as the 'institution of /r/criticaltheory' exists and I don't think it matters wetaher or not trolls are 'embraced'.

The mods of /r/criticaltheory (myself included) were invited to become mods because they appeared (to other mods) to have an interest in the discourse of this particular subreddit and were actively engaged in production of content. We are not elected, nor are we any more an 'authority' here than anyone else, we are simply active and interested in the discursive life of /r/criticaltheory and so we donate our time and attention to help see to its smooth operation. It's the community itself that has the power which they divvy up based on the way they vote, comment and post.

'Trolls' exist, online and in the world, weather or not they are embraced. Not only that, a 'troll' does not equal 'a person'. A more useful way to understand the troll's actions may be through a discussion of the attitude of 'trolling' that can and is embodied and articulated by any anon online, all the time. For all anyone knows, the person who created the troll account could be Barrak Obama himself-as ridiculous and unlikely as this claim may be-it is a key assumption that anon's share (whether or not they articulate or accept it).

If I had been active and engaged while the recent drama was unfolding, I would have not banned or removed any of the inflamatory comments. Despite a troll's tone, language or opinion, I have to agree that the point made by georges_perec in a buried comment stands: there really is nothing any anon (mod or otherwise) can really do to silence or prosecute another anon who is determined to 'troll' a particular space.

Attempting to ban or remove comments that offend even the majority's personal sensibilities is futile, and it's my position that rather than attempt to militantly instantiate some useless authority and spurr on the determined troll, (adding fuel to the fire, so to speak) I'd prefer to do one of two things:

1. Engage the troll in active dialogue and critique them in an attempt to better understand or neutralize their inflammatory remarks in an effort to find a common understanding regarding the ostensibly offensive idea; mutual

The process of elimination argument for moral realism:

Premise 1. Moral realism is one of four logically exhaustive alternatives. Either at least some moral claims refer to a property or nothing does, and either the property depends on observers or it does not.

Premise 2. The logically exhaustive alternatives to moral realism are false. At least some moral claims refer to a property, and the property does not depend on observers.

Conclusion 3. Therefore, moral realism is true.

Premise 1 is trivially obvious. If we say moral statements don’t purport to refer to a property at all, then we have ethical non-cognitivism (NC). If we say moral statements purport to refer to a property, but nothing has that property, then we have nihilism. If we say moral statements purport to refer to a property, some things have that property, but the property depends on observers, then we have subjectivism. Finally, if we say moral statements purport to refer to a property, some things have that property, and that property doesn’t depend on observers, then we have moral realism. Those are all of the possibilities.

I recommend breaking the question up into its discrete stages and evaluating each claim on its own in order to decide on your meta theory of morals. That is, first try to decide whether you think moral statements refer to something, then try to determine whether anything has the property in question, then whether it is observer-dependent.

Ethical Non-Cognitivism

i. Ethical statements do not purport to refer to a property/attribute/characteristic. Ethical statements are neither true nor false. Eg., to say "Murder is wrong" is really to say "boo murder" or "ewe! Murder!" (Ethical Non-cognitivism)

The Problem With Non-Cognitivism:

Pleasure is good.

How should we understand that statement? The most straightforward answer is the cognitivist one. Ethical cognitivism is the view that evaluative statements like 'Pleasure is good' assert propositions, which can be either true or false, just like the statements 'The sky is red' and 'Weasels are mammals.' Given this, the most straightforward account of what the word 'good' is doing in the sentence is this: there is a property, goodness, which the word refers to, and the sentence ascribes that property to pleasure.

Non-cognitivists deny that 'good' denotes a property, and they deny that 'Pleasure is good' asserts anything in the way that 'Weasels are mammals' does. It is thus up to them to give us

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) has an article about Atheism and its definitions called "Atheism and Agnosticism". In this post, I want to discuss a specific paragraph (and a bit of another) of that article, show that the author is wrong about a specific aspect and therefore present why something isn't automatically true, just because it is part of the SEP.

The paragraph I want to discuss is the following

>Departing even more radically from the norm in philosophy, a few philosophers and quite a few non-philosophers claim that “atheism” shouldn’t be defined as a proposition at all, even if theism is a proposition. Instead, “atheism” should be defined as a psychological state: the state of not believing in the existence of God (or gods). This view was famously proposed by the philosopher Antony Flew and arguably played a role in his (1972) defense of an alleged presumption of “atheism”. The editors of the Oxford Handbook of Atheism (Bullivant & Ruse 2013) also favor this definition and one of them, Stephen Bullivant (2013), defends it on grounds of scholarly utility. His argument is that this definition can best serve as an umbrella term for a wide variety of positions that have been identified with atheism. Scholars can then use adjectives like “strong” and “weak” to develop a taxonomy that differentiates various specific atheisms. Unfortunately, this argument overlooks the fact that, if atheism is defined as a psychological state, then no proposition can count as a form of atheism because a proposition is not a psychological state. This undermines his argument in defense of Flew’s definition; for it implies that what he calls “strong atheism”—the proposition (or belief in the sense of “something believed”) that there is no God—is not really a variety of atheism at all. In short, his proposed “umbrella” term leaves strong atheism out in the rain.

and the bit of another paragraph is

>Although Flew’s definition of “atheism” fails as an umbrella term, it is certainly a legitimate definition in the sense that it reports how a significant number of people use the term.

The author claims that atheism as "the state of not believing in the existence of God (or gods)" "leaves strong atheism out in the rain" and later in the following paragraph also claims that Flew's definition of atheism "fails as an umbrella term". There are seve

People say you’ve got to show up to get lucky, but they leave out the part where luck runs both ways. Since I was laid off from my last job, money has gotten tight - unemployment insurance doesn’t pay nearly as much as I used to make, so my two boys agreed to get jobs at the local mega-mart to pay for their phones and games. We also have a couple of kitties who are quite accustomed to flights of Fancy Feast and the deluxe robot litter box that scoops and cleans on every visit. There’s no white picket fence, but we do have a minivan. It comes in pretty handy for a family of five.

 

You won’t find a tragic backstory on me being a single father. My wife ran off one day and we never heard from her again. I guess that’s tragic in a sense, but it’s hard to be sad when I’m pretty sure she was riding the bartender at her old job. So many late nights, so many times she came home just before or just after sunrise, until one day she didn’t. The boys miss her, but they’re getting used to it, or maybe they’re getting too old to confide in me.

 

I’m also a veteran, US Navy. No, I wasn’t a SEAL, and I never even met a guy from DEVGRU. I was an electrician’s mate, but I didn’t learn much more than how to change lightbulbs and swap outlets. When I got out, I ended up getting a job at the power plant, thanks to creative resume writing and a healthy dose of bullshit. This was back in ‘04, when people were still proud to be fighting. Maybe the manager thought it was his patriotic duty to hire me despite my lack of real qualifications. It probably helped that I had just gotten married, with one kid in a crib and another in the oven. What I’m getting at is I haven’t been unemployed in so long that I’ve been feeling lost.

 

About a week ago, I got an email from a headhunting company that asked if I wanted to interview for a position as an independent contractor doing “alternate disposal remedies”. That was probably code for trash collecting, so I agreed to the interview. No shame in being a garbageman, as long as you’re not a garbage man. The recruiter assured me this was a modern, nontraditional company, and she advised the interview would be informal and casual. That worked for me since the only suit I had was in the attic, stuffed in a box. I hadn’t worn it since my brother’s funeral, and I had no designs on working in management. What can I say, I’m a blue collar guy.

 

It was early in the evening when I pulled

I may be out of my league with this book but where I'm at, he's criticizing non cognitivism a la Blackburn and Timmons and he says this:

The first claims that the attribution of propositional attitudes is itself a normative endeavour. 15 Attributing such attitudes analytically commits one to normative claims, and conceptually presupposes an understanding of normative vocabulary. For instance, to attribute to an agent a desire to lose weight, and a belief that dieting is the only efficient way to do so, entails a commitment to the view that the agent ought to go on a diet. One can't sensibly make this sort of attribution without being committed in this way. But then we have a circle: to see someone as holding a moral judgement, one must attribute to her some desire or favourable attitude. But to make such an attribution is itself to hold some normative commitment. Therefore the analysis of normative language itself presupposes notions of normativity. Therefore expressivists cannot make sense of ethical discourse without recourse to unreduced normativity. And this is contrary to the deepest motivations of non-cognitivism: to explain the world in a wholly naturalistic way.

I wish he would have given an example but he just moves on to the next thing. I've read 1 over view book on metaethics and thought it would help to see someone "do" metaethics and then find someone else with opposing views etc... But I'm not an academic or even a student, I stack boxes at a Walmart warehouse and read Plato religiously. Any good metaethics recommendations?

This is not the thread for sole Robyn or Kody bashing, there are plenty of threads for that. This is intended for thoughtful comments about the family dynamics and what led to the current situation. Watching tonight it struck me that I feel badly for this entire family. It's easy to try to put the blame on one person but I don't think it's that easy.

Every one of them signed up for a religious, polygamous marriage. Historically, these marriages only seem to "work" when they follow the standard patriarchal, husband is the rule maker and final authority doctrine. In this case, they decided early on to go with a consensus model with Kody as the final "tie breaker". I think this decision is what ultimately led to this cataclysm because while that seems like a progressive, new age kind of religious polygamy, it didn't mean the same thing to each of them

. I think Kody agreed to this method of conflict resolution intending it to be interpreted as he is the benevolent ruler, as long as everyone recognized his authority and paid him "due homage and respect". He never really intended it to be a democracy at all and for a long time, all the wives allowed him to be the benevolent ruler....until Robyn.

With Robyn, I believe he fell in love and lust for the first time. The other wives were like friends with benefits and common goals, ie; to raise children. Up until Robyn, he could treat all the wives pretty fairly as he really didn't love one more than the other. But the other wives were growing more and more independent and Kody was caving in to their decisions more frequently. With Robyn, not only did he truly fall in love, she was a woman who believed in following her husband's rules and making him feel like a king. Kody finally had everything he wanted. He showed blatant favoritism towards her and the burgeoning independence in the others took on the form of minor rebellions and attitude changes. The other wives no longer were willing to fall in line and treat him like the benevolent ruler. They started demanding to have their way in things which to him was them going back on what he felt was their initial agreement,ie; he's the tie breaker, final authority. That's why he keeps bringing up the respect issue. He didn't stop to realize he was the one who broke the initial polygamous rule of not showing blatant favoritism to any of the wives and this is what caused the wives to stop respecting him and allowing him to be the final authority.

Robyn is actually

I don't want to step on anybody's toes here, but the amount of non-dad jokes here in this subreddit really annoys me. First of all, dad jokes CAN be NSFW, it clearly says so in the sub rules. Secondly, it doesn't automatically make it a dad joke if it's from a conversation between you and your child. Most importantly, the jokes that your CHILDREN tell YOU are not dad jokes. The point of a dad joke is that it's so cheesy only a dad who's trying to be funny would make such a joke. That's it. They are stupid plays on words, lame puns and so on. There has to be a clever pun or wordplay for it to be considered a dad joke.

Again, to all the fellow dads, I apologise if I'm sounding too harsh. But I just needed to get it off my chest.

I guess the concept didn't work

So, I'm reading a Lewis paper called 'De Dicto and De Se' and for the life of me I cannot get a handle on what he is talking about.

Does anyone know what a de dicto and a de se is? And what the difference is between them?

Is it coherent to be a weak illusionist (who endorses something Attention Schema Theory) regard consciousness and reject other tenets/flavors ofEM, for example can one retain Intentionality, Propositional attitudes, qualia, etc. What is the most of folk psychology and the above attributes can one keep in their ontology under Illusionism?

Introduction

Greetings! This here is a very basic outline of epistemology, the philosophical discipline that studies knowledge. I hope this guide will be helpful to theists and atheists alike. Be forewarned, I am not an expert, not even close - merely an interested lay-person. My goal is simply to give an overview of the various concepts and positions, to facilitate informed discussion. Although, to be honest, it is also to get these ideas straight in my own head :)

I will not present every position. Nor will I present any arguments for or against the various positions (both to remain unbiased and for brevity). I would ideally like to give many examples for each concept, but unfortunately, I feel I must cut most of these for brevity (please add some in the comments if you like!)

Everything I say is up for debate and constructive criticism. I may accidentally say something that is misleading, or straight-up incorrect. Please correct me if I do, preferably with a source

Key terms (ie google-able words) have been bolded. Italics are for emphasis

My sources are the SEP, IEP, and Wikipedia

Theories of truth

Let’s start with the most basic concept. What is [“truth”](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth/)? There are a few theories of truth, with some subtle distinctions between them, but most aren’t relevant here

The most widely held view is the [Correspondence Theory of Truth. This holds that “a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds to reality”. So, for example, the proportion “snow is white” is true if and only if is actually the case that snow is white.

Another popular view is the Deflationary Theory of Truth. This view is based on the observation that the sentence "it is true that snow is white" doesn't seem to add any substantial content to simply asserting "the snow is white". The main idea of the deflationary approach is (a) that all that can be significantly said about truth is exhausted by an account of the role of the expression ‘true’ or of the concept of truth in our talk and thought, and (b) that, by contrast with what traditional views assume, this role is neither metaphysically substantive nor explanatory (SEP)

A minority view is the [Coherence Theory of Truth]([https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-coherence](https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tru

Unedited; questionable language

The Parent Visit.

Previously: Vegas, baby! The girls got to see Bret in concert, which made some of them drink heavily. In their defense, having a Poison music video marathon on YouTube last night totally made me do the same. Heather finally started to see Lacey's scheming ways and declared an end to their alliance, while the cold, smooth feeling of a toilet bowl against her cheek prompted Brandi to express her love to Bret. Like any person with sense, she reneged the next day. Bret got pissed and sent her home, and we now have our final three!

It is morning in L.A. Heather and Lacey make awkward small talk, and Heather interviews that, after the way Lacey acted in Vegas, Heather doesn't trust her. Lacey has a similar "every girl for herself" attitude, and Jes tells us that her connection with Bret has really intensified, so she has to be sure to tell him how she feels. Bret twiddles with his guitar, and presumably other things, in the B.A.M.B. room, which still has the Polaroids of Brandi M. and Heather on the door. Bret has a big surprise for the Awesome Threesome -- he's asked their parents to come and live at the house for a weekend. And really, we can't say that Bret Michaels never gave anything to humanity, because this is going to be unbelievable. You marry the girl, you marry the parents, says Bret. What about when you just get a daily beej from the girl? Hope you brought kneepads, Lacey's dad!

Big John calls Heather out because -- surprise! Her parents are there. To her credit, she is super-excited. She's only ever seen her parents in a room together about two other times in her life. Not that that makes people turn into strippers, all you divorced parents out there! Keep on keeping on. Heather apparently got her fashion sense from her mom, who is wearing a sequined top. Bret emerges from his room with a look of fright, and interviews that if there's one thing that makes a rock star nervous, it's meeting a girl's parents. Yes, Bret, but how does it make YOU feel? Bret introduces himself to Brenda and David, and says his first impression was that they were cool. It's true -- you can tell that they're a fun time. Heather's dad is a party-loving good old boy from Florida, and he and Bret talk about how the Jaguars always cream the Steelers. Thanks for reminding me, Bret.

Lacey and Jes see Heather's parents and know something's up. Sure enough, Jes's folks are the next to arrive. She starts tearing up when she go

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311866936_A_Confucian_Conception_of_C

A Confucian Conception of Critical Thinking

CHARLENE TAN

ABSTRACT

This article proposes a Confucian conception of critical thinking by focussing on the
notion of judgement. It is argued that the attainment of the Confucian ideal of li
(normative behaviours) necessitates and promotes critical thinking in at least two
ways. First, the observance of li requires the individual to exercise judgement by
applying the generalised knowledge, norms and procedures in dao (Way) to particular
action-situations insightfully and flexibly. Secondly, the individual’s judgement, to
qualify as an instance of li, should be underpinned and motivated by the ethical quality
of ren (humanity) that testifies to one’s moral character. Two educational implications
arising from a Confucian conception of critical thinking are highlighted. First, the
Confucian interpretation presented in this essay challenges the perception that critical
thinking is absent from or culturally incompatible with Chinese traditions. Secondly,
such a conception advocates a view of critical thinking as judgement that is action-
oriented, spiritual-ethical and interpersonal.

INTRODUCTION

Current conceptions of critical thinking are primarily derived from Anglo-European
histories, traditions, writings, paradigms and experiences. A number of scholars have
maintained that critical thinking in academic and popular discourses originated from
Greek and Enlightenment philosophies and presuppositions (e.g. Griffin, 1988;
Gardner, 1989; Burbules, 1995; Barnett, 1997; Thayer-Bacon, 2000; Cuypers, 2004).
A representative view is the observation by Gardner (1989) that ‘we in the West
esteem too narrow a band of capacities—a certain form of logical-rational thought,
which grew out of the Greco-Roman heritage (shades of Meno!) and has dominated
our schooling and dictated the form and content of our standardised tests’ (p. 110).
This state of affairs has contributed to a perception that critical thinking is a Western
product and is concomitantly absent from, marginalised in and/or culturally
incompat

Alot of great jokes get posted here! However just because you have a joke, doesn't mean it's a dad joke.

THIS IS NOT ABOUT NSFW, THIS IS ABOUT LONG JOKES, BLONDE JOKES, SEXUAL JOKES, KNOCK KNOCK JOKES, POLITICAL JOKES, ETC BEING POSTED IN A DAD JOKE SUB

Try telling these sexual jokes that get posted here, to your kid and see how your spouse likes it.. if that goes well, Try telling one of your friends kid about your sex life being like Coca cola, first it was normal, than light and now zero , and see if the parents are OK with you telling their kid the "dad joke"

I'm not even referencing the NSFW, I'm saying Dad jokes are corny, and sometimes painful, not sexual

So check out r/jokes for all types of jokes

r/unclejokes for dirty jokes

r/3amjokes for real weird and alot of OC

r/cleandadjokes If your really sick of seeing not dad jokes in r/dadjokes

Punchline !

Edit: this is not a post about NSFW , This is about jokes, knock knock jokes, blonde jokes, political jokes etc being posted in a dad joke sub

Edit 2: don't touch the thermostat

Do your worst!

How the hell am I suppose to know when it’s raining in Sweden?

Mathematical puns makes me number

Ants don’t even have the concept fathers, let alone a good dad joke. Keep r/ants out of my r/dadjokes.

But no, seriously. I understand rule 7 is great to have intelligent discussion, but sometimes it feels like 1 in 10 posts here is someone getting upset about the jokes on this sub. Let the mods deal with it, they regulate the sub.

They were cooked in Greece.

Can someone explain to me what exactly is the difference between "idea" and "sense" (Sinn) in Frege? I understand that for him an expression puts in relation three things: idea, sense and reference. The reference is the object denotated by that expression. If we say that the reference is the true meaning of that expression, problems like the Frege's puzzle arise, since an object is mind-independent, but the truth value of propositions could depend an propositional attitudes of the speakers. We also have subjective ideas that we associate to expressions, and this too is clear to me. My idea of "Clark Kent" could differ from other people ideas of Clark Kent (some of us might even not know that he is Superman). But Frege refuse to use ideas as the meaning of expression, due to their subjective nature. We would not be able to explain how we are able to communicate if meaning was purely subjective. A sense seems to be something between ideas and references. It's a mental content, but it's objective. Now to me an "objective mental content" sounds almost like a contradiction in terms. I also think the examples made by Frege (like the one with the telescope and the Moon) fail to clarify what he means. Can someone help me? Doesn't this sound like an ad hoc solution (in a negative way) to solve his puzzle? Is there even something else aside the idea that I associate to an expression and the object denotated by that expression?

Dear all,

For example, when we analyze belief, we find that it takes in a proposition:

 1. S believes that P | Sarah believes [it is raining outside].

and not a term:

 1.' S believes x | Sarah believes [apple 1]. 

With prefers or approves, it seems at first to be quite obvious that it takes in terms:

 2. S prefers x | Sarah prefers [the color red].

 3. S approves of x | S approves of [killing].

But can "prefer" and "approve" also take in propositions? Does it always? For example:

 4. S prefers P | Sarah prefers that [it is raining outside].

 5. S approves of x | Sarah approves of [the fact that it is raining outside].

(Prefers seems to work better than approves.)

I am interested in this question because I was thinking about the infinite regress objection to subjectivism.

Thanks a lot!

The process of elimination argument for moral realism:

Premise 1. Moral realism is one of four logically exhaustive alternatives. Either at least some moral claims refer to a property or nothing does, and either the property depends on observers or it does not.

Premise 2. The logically exhaustive alternatives to moral realism are false. At least some moral claims refer to a property, and the property does not depend on observers.

Conclusion 3. Therefore, moral realism is true.

Premise 1 is trivially obvious. If we say moral statements don’t purport to refer to a property at all, then we have ethical non-cognitivism (NC). If we say moral statements purport to refer to a property, but nothing has that property, then we have nihilism. If we say moral statements purport to refer to a property, some things have that property, but the property depends on observers, then we have subjectivism. Finally, if we say moral statements purport to refer to a property, some things have that property, and that property doesn’t depend on observers, then we have moral realism. Those are all of the possibilities.

I recommend breaking the question up into its discrete stages and evaluating each claim on its own in order to decide on your meta theory of morals. That is, first try to decide whether you think moral statements refer to something, then try to determine whether anything has the property in question, then whether it is observer-dependent.

Ethical Non-Cognitivism

i. Ethical statements do not purport to refer to a property/attribute/characteristic. Ethical statements are neither true nor false. Eg., to say "Murder is wrong" is really to say "boo murder" or "ewe! Murder!" (Ethical Non-cognitivism)

The Problem With Non-Cognitivism:

Pleasure is good.

How should we understand that statement? The most straightforward answer is the cognitivist one. Ethical cognitivism is the view that evaluative statements like 'Pleasure is good' assert propositions, which can be either true or false, just like the statements 'The sky is red' and 'Weasels are mammals.' Given this, the most straightforward account of what the word 'good' is doing in the sentence is this: there is a property, goodness, which the word refers to, and the sentence ascribes that property to pleasure.

Non-cognitivists deny that 'good' denotes a property, and they deny that 'Pleasure is good' asserts anything in the way that 'Weasels are mammals' does. It is thus up to them to give us