From The Golden Age of Indian Buddhist Philosophy:

The positions [of the Sautrāntika school] we have described above seem to bear some considerable similarity with ideas that are later elaborated in greater detail in Yogācāra.¹⁶⁰ The representationalist position resulting from the Sautrāntika theory of momentariness can be naturally extended into an idealist position if we are able to argue (as Yogācārins indeed did later) that our perception of the world can be accounted for just in terms of these representations, without postulating a distinct level of represented objects as well. If we can perceive non-existent objects, it is far easier to understand how it can appear to us that we are living in a world of material objects, even though there are no such things. The Sautrāntika conception of mental continuity can be seen as being developed into a theory of foundational consciousness along Yogācāra lines, and the notion of permanent, wholesome factors within mental continua has obvious affinities with tathāgatagarbha theory.

All of this would make it appear as if there is a line of ideas beginning when the Sautrāntika split off from the Sarvāstivāda, a line which is then later taken up by Vasubandhu and used to criticize the Sarvāstivāda position in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, acts as a seed for various Yogācāra ideas, and is later incorporated into the systems of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, systems which have at least a strong affinity to Yogācāra.

There are, however, good reasons to be sceptical about this supposed germination of Yogācāra from Sautrāntika. The main difficulty is that we do not have a clear conception of the kind of Sautrāntika that is supposed to have preceded Vasubandhu. As Walser¹⁶¹ points out, they ‘left no physical trace of themselves—no inscriptions, no cache of manuscripts, nothing to locate them either geographically or physically’. Most of the information we have about Sautrāntika beliefs stems from Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya. Did he accurately report their positions? Lacking the original documents to compare Vasubandhu’s position with, it is impossible to tell. It has been suggested recently that Vasubandhu, rather than endorsing the Sautrāntika position when composing the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, was in fact already a Yogācārin.¹⁶² This argument is based mainly on the fact that a considerable amount of the Sautrāntika positions (or positions very much like them) that Vasubandhu puts forward against the Sarvā

Recently I posted here about Thüken Losang Chökyi Nyima's advice concerning the joint study of two Yogācāra texts: Bodhisattvabhūmi and Māhayānasūtrālaṃkāra. Since then I have determined which sections of each correspond to one another and have decided to read these texts in the interest of studying their extensive explanations of the Māhayāna path. The two have been heavily influential everywhere that Yogācāra has been, so might be of interest to Indo-Tibetan or East Asian Buddhists, but they may also be of interest to Theravāda Buddhists looking to essentially explore something similar to Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga but for the Māhayāna path.

I want to expand this into a study group that would perhaps read a chapter or two a week from each (most of the chapters aren't very long) such that each topic could be explored from the perspective of both texts. I've compiled the correspondence between the two using the Dharmachakra translation of MSA and Engle's translation of BSB, and intend to read from these translations. My thought is that this could be done with a regularly scheduled Zoom or a discord server or something. Comment if you have thoughts and if you are interested I'll send a pm with a discord link.

Here is the advice concerning the joint study that I posted about before:

Although The Stage of a Bodhisattva (i.e. Bodhisattvabhūmi, the 15th section of Yogācārabhūmi) does not address all of the Ornament’s (i.e. Māhayānasūtrālaṃkāra) subject matter in exactly the same order and was not written as a word commentary that interprets the actual language, it does supplement the explanations that appear there by delineating [various topics] that are not addressed and expanding on those that are presented in an abbreviated form. It takes individual elements described there at great length and presents them in a form that is easily understood. In certain instances where the elements of a particular practice are addressed at length in [the Ornament], [The Stage of a Bodhisattva] describes them from the perspective of the practitioner who undertakes them. Likewise, [topics that are] described at length in [the Ornament] as antidotes are presented in [The *Stage of a Bodhisa

“How should the pure buddha realms of the buddhas be understood?” They are as described in the introduction to the One-Hundred-Thousand-Line Sūtra of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka (this is an unknown sūtra, but Paramārtha mentions that it is a distinct pure land sūtra in one hundred thousand lines in the Bodhisattvapiṭaka), which says that (1) the Bhagavān resides in the great palace that is an array of the brilliantly radiating seven kinds of precious substances, which emits great light rays that completely fill infinite world realms. (2) Its configuration is immeasurable and well apportioned in its distribution of distinct dwellings. (3) Its territory (maṇḍala) is unlimited. (4) Its sphere transcends the three realms. (5) It arises from supramundane [roots of virtue] and the roots of virtue that are higher than it. (6) It has the characteristic of the completely pure cognizance of mastery. (7) It is the residence of the Tathāgata. (8) It is the support of great bodhisattvas. (9) Innumerable gods, nāgas, yakṣas, gandharvas, asuras, garuḍas, kiṃnaras, mahoragas, humans, and nonhumans roam [in it]. (10) It is supported by virtue of the great joy and bliss of the taste of the dharma. (11) It sustains the promotion of the entire welfare of all sentient beings. (12) It is free from all harm by the afflictions. (13) It expels all māras. (14) Surpassing all [other] arrays, it is arrayed through the blessings of the Tathāgata. (15) Its deliverance is through great mindfulness, intelligence, and realization. (16) Its vehicle consists of great calm abiding and superior insight. (17) It is entered through the great doors to liberation that are emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness. (18) It rests upon the array of a jeweled great lotus king, adorned by immeasurable collections of qualities.

Therefore, the pure realms of the buddhas display (1) the perfection of color and they also display (2) the perfection of shape, (3) the perfection of size, (4) the perfection of domain, (5) the perfection of causes, (6) the perfection of result, (7) the perfection of ruler, (8) the perfection of entourage, (9) the perfection of servants, (10) the perfection of support, (11) the perfection of enlightened activity, (12) the perfection of benefit, (13) the perfection of fearlessness, (14) the perfection of abode, (15) the perfection of the path, (16) the perfection of mount, (17) the perfection of doors, and (18) the perfection of foundation.

Also, the enjoyments of the pure realm

Asking about this because in Essence of Eloquence, Tsongkhapa suggests that its existence is known solely through various inferential proofs, and all of the sources he cites seem to only present such things but never say "the ālāyavijñāna is perceptible."

I ask because there's something I've been wondering about. In later Yogācāra the notion develops that a defining mark of a vijñāna is reflexive self-cognition, i.e. a vijñāna's content is both whatever the content is and also that the vijñāna exists. On this basis, the later Yogācāra thinkers are able to make an epistemic argument for vijñaptimātra, by saying "mind and mental contents are knowable via direct perception, but this is not true of posited mind-independent things, which must be inferred, and thus have a weaker justification."

However, it seems that the ālāyavijñāna is also known only through inference. This seems to present an issue, because if the ālāyavijñāna can't be directly perceived, then it seems to be on the same epistemic level for explaining how various appearances arise as a hypothesized external world. At that point, you'd end up just picking one on parsimony, and I don't think a Yogācārin would want to accept that.

Hence, I can't believe that in Yogācāra it is held that the ālāyavijñāna can only be known through inference, because this seems to mess up one of the main arguments for vijñaptimātra. But if it must be perceptible as well, this raises two questions.

1. Why isn't it perceptible all the time?
2. What perceives it?

The first question needs an answer to maintain the normally subliminal nature of karmic seeds. The second question needs an answer because if one can become aware of the ālāyavijñāna, there must be some awareness which takes the ālāyavijñāna as an object.

A possible answer to the first question is that it is perceptible all the time, but we are ordinarily too distracted and our attention is too unrefined to notice, thus we only actually perceive it properly in great concentration. I have listened to a talk from B. Alan Wallace where he suggests that this is a position he has learned, but he did not cite a source for this.

A possible answer to the second question is that it is reflexively self-cognizing, the way that later Yogācāra thinkers said that vijñāna are in general.

In any case, I want to know if there is an actual answer to the questions in Yogācāra texts themselves, so hopefully one of you might know.

TLDR on my questions, which I am lo

The recognition that phenomenal appearance is but the play of the mind itself is a means of discovering how beings fall into samsara and how they can be liberated from it. Due to the fact that various misguided habitual tendencies have been deposited upon the mind, the unbroken continuum of samsara occurs as different kinds of dreamlike appearance. And because there is no cause for this other than the mind itself, the fact that the mind falls under the power of defiled emotion and enters into the realms of existence is not something that can be prevented even by the hand of the Tathagata. On the other hand, if one gains control over one’s own mind, this very fact alone will bring everything into one’s power. Indeed, it is not necessary to rely on other causes, such as making offerings to the gods or trying only to escape from the bad and seek the good. It is by mastering one’s own mind that one reaches “acceptance” on the path of joining. One will thus be preserved from falling once again into the lower realms, and all the qualities of the path and fruit will manifest. On the other hand, if all this were due not to one’s mind but to some external force, all manner of things both good and evil would uninterruptedly appear. Someone on the path would thus be powerless to avoid suffering, for this would be the product of external forces. Consequently, the knowledge that phenomena are the mind’s projection gives rise to a firm and certain understanding of how the samsaric process is set in motion and how liberation from it is to be achieved. To establish all things as being the mind is the supreme and distinctive feature of the tenets of all the Buddhas.

This indeed is the true understanding of the appearing mode of phenomena. It is the supreme crucial point of the pith instructions for meditation. It destroys the whole mechanism of existence with the sure touch of a butcher who knows exactly how to kill an animal, and like a carpenter who understands how to work his wood. And if this point is associated with extraordinary methods, it becomes the very essence of the pith instructions of the Vajrayana.

Nowadays, those who fail to find the root of the Dharma in their experience and who content themselves only with putting words in their mouths depreciate the practice of examining the mind [in meditation] and exalt that of reasoning. They think that it is by logical arguments and extensive explanations that they will accomplish the path. But while it is indeed n

Despite being available on ProQuest I couldn't find the URL to the preview, the title occurs on the top of the search list.

Proquest URL: https://dissexpress.proquest.com/dxweb/results.html?QryTxt=Echoes+of+empty+luminosity&By=&Title=&pubnum=

ISBN: 978-0-549-44731-3

Thanks in advance.

I'm a Yogācāran Buddhist with a desire for becoming a monk since I first became a Buddhist around 4 years ago. I am of the Yogācāran sect, and this is where the issue arises: I can't for the life of me find any Yogācāran Monasteries in the West. Hell, even after some vigorous digging, I could only find this monastery, which is half a world a way from my country. I'm not yet ready, I feel, to become a monk, however I am going to have to locate some monasteries, and I'm in this process now. If anyone knows of any in the western world, even if it's in a non-English speaking country, please tell me. I will go to an Asian monastery if necessary, but only as a last resort.

Edit: I am a bit surprised that this can be a controversial post, based on the ups and downs of the votes. (62% upvoted) I suspect those who downvoted just saw the picture below and didn't read. Read please. Or else don't simply vote. People who read said this is good.

Why study the history of the evolution of Buddhism? Why not just stick to the suttas and vinayas and not learn about history?

When people ask questions about the current forms of Buddhism, it makes most sense only when one has a rough idea at least of the history of how they arise. It also could affect the amount of faith one would place in this or that form of Buddhism one sees today.

Pre-Buddhism

There was a race of people called the Aryans who are likely the people who originated the Indo-European languages including Sanskrit, Pali (Malay and Singhalese borrowed many words from Pali), English, Germanic languages, Latin etc. Yes, these are the same Aryans which the Nazi identified themselves with, and now the terminology to call them is Indo-Iranian.

In ancient India, before the Buddha's time, there was Zoroastrianism. In that religion, Ahuras are the good gods, Daevas are the bad gods. Karen Armstrong in her books described that it's because the Aryans who migrated into northern India was a bunch of raiders, pillagers, nomads. They prefer war, and their gods are the daevas. The ones being stolen from are the agriculturists who worked hard on the land and cattle.

It's only later on that the Aryans settled down and established the caste system in India with them at the top castes, and the natives of India at the bottom rank. So their gods became the devas of Buddhism and the opposition ahuras became the asuras. A role reversal of the devas being the good gods now and the asuras being the demons. For the secularists, do note that even with such historical trace of the evolution of devas, there could still be possible that there does exist such beings as gods and demons, which is a standard faith for Buddhists.

Brahmanism is the mainstream religion of India back in Buddha's time, along with 6 heretical teachers. They represent the doctrines of Jainism, Agnosticism, Fatalism, Amoralism, Materialism, Eternalism.

Hinduism evolves out of Brahmanism's interaction with Buddhism, and they absorbed the figure of the [Buddha into one of the avatars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gautama_Buddha_in_Hinduis

I came across this here passage while browsing through Dayi Daoxin's Terebess page, and found it interesting considering we've such a history of people asking how Daoism relates to Zen on this sub. In doing my research on it however, I soon fell down a rabbit hole and found it did more than just this and went straight to the heart of a lot of controversial questions on this sub, including:

• What is Zen's relationship to Daoism?
• Is Zen Buddhist?
• What is "zazen"?
• What is the Zen lineage? Can we trust its biographical and genealogical accounts?
• What does early Zen have to say about Zen as a whole and can we trust the sources?

This is a long post.

Without any further ado, here is the passage that started this all:

>The great master said –
>
>Zhuangzi taught:
>
>Heaven and earth are one finger.All things are one horse.
>
>But the Dharmapada sūtra says:
>
>‘One' does not just mean the number one;The intention is the refutation of all numbers.Only students of shallow intellectMean the number one when they say ‘one'.
>
>Thus Zhuangzi seems to be stuck at the idea of ‘one'.
>
>Laozi said:
>
>So subtle! So profound!Its essence is within.
>
>Here, even though there are no categories outside, the mind is still preserved within. The Avataṃsaka sūtra says:
>
>Do not be attached to dualistic entities,As there is neither singularity nor duality.
>
>And the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa sūtra corroborates this by saying:
>
>Mind does not exist internally or externally,Nor anywhere in between.
>
>When we understand this, we can see that Laozi is stuck at the idea of the existence of an essential awareness.

As we can see, Daoxin is allegedly disputing the idea of the "one/many" metaphysics that features chiefly in the proto-Daoist texts of Laozi and Zhuangzi, hinting at some nameless, swirling flow of constant flux and change hidden behind the appearances we see in the world, as well as the idea of a primordial awareness which subtly lurks behind the scenes, by his reading here.

Instead, he quotes Mahayana Buddhist scripture and suggests that the truth of the teachings is beyond the teaching of these two texts.

But... this is where the rabbit hole begins...

______________________________________________________

I don't want to step on anybody's toes here, but the amount of non-dad jokes here in this subreddit really annoys me. First of all, dad jokes CAN be NSFW, it clearly says so in the sub rules. Secondly, it doesn't automatically make it a dad joke if it's from a conversation between you and your child. Most importantly, the jokes that your CHILDREN tell YOU are not dad jokes. The point of a dad joke is that it's so cheesy only a dad who's trying to be funny would make such a joke. That's it. They are stupid plays on words, lame puns and so on. There has to be a clever pun or wordplay for it to be considered a dad joke.

Again, to all the fellow dads, I apologise if I'm sounding too harsh. But I just needed to get it off my chest.

Do your worst!

I'm surprised it hasn't decade.

For context I'm a Refuse Driver (Garbage man) & today I was on food waste. After I'd tipped I was checking the wagon for any defects when I spotted a lone pea balanced on the lifts.

I said "hey look, an escaPEA"

No one near me but it didn't half make me laugh for a good hour or so!

Edit: I can't believe how much this has blown up. Thank you everyone I've had a blast reading through the replies 😂

It really does, I swear!

They’re on standbi

Because she wanted to see the task manager.

Pilot on me!!

Nothing, he was gladiator.

Dad jokes are supposed to be jokes you can tell a kid and they will understand it and find it funny.

This sub is mostly just NSFW puns now.

If it needs a NSFW tag it's not a dad joke. There should just be a NSFW puns subreddit for that.

Edit* I'm not replying any longer and turning off notifications but to all those that say "no one cares", there sure are a lot of you arguing about it. Maybe I'm wrong but you people don't need to be rude about it. If you really don't care, don't comment.

What did 0 say to 8 ?

" Nice Belt "

So What did 3 say to 8 ?

" Hey, you two stop making out "

When I got home, they were still there.

I won't be doing that today!

[Removed]

Where ever you left it 🤷‍♀️🤭

This morning, my 4 year old daughter.

Daughter: I'm hungry

Me: nerves building, smile widening

Me: Hi hungry, I'm dad.

She had no idea what was going on but I finally did it.

Thank you all for listening.

You take away their little brooms

Asking about this because in Essence of Eloquence, Tsongkhapa suggests that its existence is known solely through various inferential proofs, and all of the sources he cites seem to only present such things but never say "the ālāyavijñāna is perceptible."

I ask because there's something I've been wondering about. In later Yogācāra the notion develops that a defining mark of a vijñāna is reflexive self-cognition, i.e. a vijñāna's content is both whatever the content is and also that the vijñāna exists. On this basis, the later Yogācāra thinkers are able to make an epistemic argument for vijñaptimātra, by saying "mind and mental contents are knowable via direct perception, but this is not true of posited mind-independent things, which must be inferred, and thus have a weaker justification."

However, it seems that the ālāyavijñāna is also known only through inference. This seems to present an issue, because if the ālāyavijñāna can't be directly perceived, then it seems to be on the same epistemic level for explaining how various appearances arise as a hypothesized external world. At that point, you'd end up just picking one on parsimony, and I don't think a Yogācārin would want to accept that.

Hence, I can't believe that in Yogācāra it is held that the ālāyavijñāna can only be known through inference, because this seems to mess up one of the main arguments for vijñaptimātra. But if it must be perceptible as well, this raises two questions.

1. Why isn't it perceptible all the time?
2. What perceives it?

The first question needs an answer to maintain the normally subliminal nature of karmic seeds. The second question needs an answer because if one can become aware of the ālāyavijñāna, there must be some awareness which takes the ālāyavijñāna as an object.

A possible answer to the first question is that it is perceptible all the time, but we are ordinarily too distracted and our attention is too unrefined to notice, thus we only actually perceive it properly in great concentration. I have listened to a talk from B. Alan Wallace where he suggests that this is a position he has learned, but he did not cite a source for this.

A possible answer to the second question is that it is reflexively self-cognizing, the way that later Yogācāra thinkers said that vijñāna are in general.

In any case, I want to know if there is an actual answer to the questions in Yogācāra texts themselves, so hopefully one of you might know.

TLDR on my questions, which I am lo

Asking about this because in Essence of Eloquence, Tsongkhapa suggests that its existence is known solely through various inferential proofs, and all of the sources he cites seem to only present such things but never say "the ālāyavijñāna is perceptible."

I ask because there's something I've been wondering about. In later Yogācāra the notion develops that a defining mark of a vijñāna is reflexive self-cognition, i.e. a vijñāna's content is both whatever the content is and also that the vijñāna exists. On this basis, the later Yogācāra thinkers are able to make an epistemic argument for vijñaptimātra, by saying "mind and mental contents are knowable via direct perception, but this is not true of posited mind-independent things, which must be inferred, and thus have a weaker justification."

However, it seems that the ālāyavijñāna is also known only through inference. This seems to present an issue, because if the ālāyavijñāna can't be directly perceived, then it seems to be on the same epistemic level for explaining how various appearances arise as a hypothesized external world. At that point, you'd end up just picking one on parsimony, and I don't think a Yogācārin would want to accept that.

Hence, I can't believe that in Yogācāra it is held that the ālāyavijñāna can only be known through inference, because this seems to mess up one of the main arguments for vijñaptimātra. But if it must be perceptible as well, this raises two questions.

1. Why isn't it perceptible all the time?
2. What perceives it?

The first question needs an answer to maintain the normally subliminal nature of karmic seeds. The second question needs an answer because if one can become aware of the ālāyavijñāna, there must be some awareness which takes the ālāyavijñāna as an object.

A possible answer to the first question is that it is perceptible all the time, but we are ordinarily too distracted and our attention is too unrefined to notice, thus we only actually perceive it properly in great concentration. I have listened to a talk from B. Alan Wallace where he suggests that this is a position he has learned, but he did not cite a source for this.

A possible answer to the second question is that it is reflexively self-cognizing, the way that later Yogācāra thinkers said that vijñāna are in general.

In any case, I want to know if there is an actual answer to the questions in Yogācāra texts themselves, so hopefully one of you might know.

TLDR on my questions, which I am lo

There hasn't been a post all year!